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IP, PHONE HOME: THE UNEASY RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN COPYRIGHT AND PRIVACY,
ILLUSTRATED IN THE LAWS OF HONG KONG
AND AUSTRALIA
U
Graham Greenleaf
The development of content-protection technologies (CPT) and digital rights
management systems (DRMS), despite their benefits to rights-holders, pose many
dangers to the protection of privacy, which some have said could mean an end to the
privacy of reading. Hong Kong and Australia are two of the earliest jurisdictions in
the world with laws implementing the ant-circumvention and rights management
information (RMI) protection provisions arising from the WIPO Copyright Treaty
1996 (WCT). They are also two of the few jurisdictions outside Europe with privacy
(data protection) laws applying to the private sector. These two jurisdictions,
therefore, give two of the best illustrations of the tensions now arising between
copyright and privacy: property versus privacy. In this article, the author explores
how CPT and DRMS affect privacy, how existing data protection and privacy laws
affect the operation of CPT and DRMS, and whether laws against copyright
circumvention devices and interference with RMI prevent privacy protection. The
author concludes that privacy could now be unduly prejudiced in favour of property,
and suggests reforms which may help restore the balance.
Property Versus Privacy
"Information wants to be free"' is one of the "myths of digital libertarian-
ism"2 that formed the ideology of the pre-commercial Internet. Digital
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libertarians expected intellectual property (IP) law to be one of the first ca-
sualties of cyberspace, because the process of digitisation of works made them
infinitely reproducible at virtually no marginal cost and infinitely distribut-
able via the Internet. The Internet and property in information were widely
believed to be incompatible: technology would win against law and set infor-
mation free. "Everything [you know] about intellectual property is wrong"
claimed John Perry Barlow.'
The reverse process is now underway: technical protection of IP in cyberspace
(ie over networks) may protect property interests in digital works' more com-
prehensively than has ever been possible in physical space, and destroy many
public interest elements in IP law in the process. In the worst scenarios, the
surveillance mechanisms being developed to do this may also bring about the
end of the anonymity of reading. Privacy is one of the interests threatened.
In criticising Barlow, Lessig observed that infinite copies could only be
made if "the code permits such copying", and questioned why the code
(software and other aspects of the technical architecture of cyberspace) could
not be changed to make such copying impossible.' For IP, this architecture
involves content-protecting technologies (CPT) 6 and digital rights manage-
ment systems (DRMS).' IP has become one of the areas where cyberspace
architecture is said to be replacing law as the most effective method of pro-
tecting interests. However, the new adjuncts to IP law discussed in this paper
(laws against circumvention devices and laws protecting rights management
information (RMI)) are part of this change. Contract law is also a vital part
of the new paradigm for protection of digital content. The process is one of
law being partly replaced by technology, but with new and different forms of
law supporting the protection by technology and vice-versa.
DRMS and CPT have many legal implications, but this paper only focuses
on their effect on privacy and their relationship to privacy laws. It explores
what protections are found in information privacy laws against surveillance
by digital works, their interaction with these new adjuncts to IP laws, and the
extent to which privacy laws may need to be strengthened to help provide a
reasonable balance between privacy and the protection of IP.
John Perry Barlow, "Selling Wine Without Bottles: The Economy of Mind on the Global Net"
Wired Archive 2.03 (1993) at 86, http://www.eff.org/pub/Publications/JohnPerry-Barlow/HTML/
idea economy-article.html.
4 "Digital works" is used loosely in this article to refer to any digital artefact that could embody
copyright subedit matter.
5 "Code Replacing Law: Intellectual Property" in Lawrence Lessig, "The Law Of The Horse: What
Cyberlaw Might Teach" (1998) 113 Harvard Law Review 501, http://lessig.org/content/articles/works/
finalhls.pdf or http://www.swiss.ai.mit.edu/classes/6.805/articles/lessig-horse.pdf.
6 There is no widely accepted terminology for individual technologies that protect digital content.
The author uses "CPT" to refer to "content protecting technologies" rather than "copyright-
protecting", because they protect content which copyright does not protect.
7 DRMS were also known as electronic copyright management systems (ECMS), but DRMS is the
more current terminology.
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These tensions between property and privacy are illustrated by the laws of
Hong Kong and Australia, because they are two of the earliest jurisdictions in
the world to implement the anti-circumvention and RMI protection provi-
sions arising from the WIPO Copyright Treaty 1996 (WCT), and because
they are also two of the few jurisdictions outside Europe with privacy (data
protection) laws applying to their private sectors. Their laws illustrate the
tensions now arising between copyright protection and the protection of
privacy: property versus privacy.
Perhaps we have only received a fragment of Brand's' aphorism: is it really
"Information wants to be free ... but it wants to keep you under surveillance"?
Anonymity and Privacy - Traditional IP Rights
We should start by considering some of the ways in which IP laws and en-
forcement practices have traditionally respected privacy, so as to appreciate
better what changes are inherent in new laws and practices. Here are some
common, though not universal, features of how users9 of copyright artefacts
experienced copyright law in the pre-digital era (and still do in relation to
non-digital embodiments of works):
1 Most sales of artefacts embodying copyright works (books, CDs, videos,
etc) were anonymous because they were cash transactions, with pay-
ment by identified means at the option of the purchaser, not the
copyright owner.
2 Users of copyright artefacts did not usually enter into any contractual
relationship with the owner of the copyright, as they dealt only with
intermediaries (booksellers, record stores, libraries, etc). This is one
reason why copyright was needed as a property right, since contract
was inadequate protection for the copyright owner.
3 The artefacts had no inherent surveillance capacities. They would not
record (much less, communicate) who had used them, when or where.
4 Copyright law did not give copyright owners a general right to control
uses of artefacts embodying their works, other than the specified
8 One list of famous quotes adds "Among others. No telling who really said this first", http://world.
std.com/-tob/quotes.htm. However, John Perry Barlow insists (though he still doesn't give a source)
that the full version of Brand's quote is: "Information wants to be free - because it is now so easy to
copy and distribute casually - and information wants to be expensive - because in an Information
Age, nothing is so valuable as the right information at the right time." (Barlow, in an Atlantic
Monthly Roundtable, http://www.theatlantic.com/unbound/forum/copyright/barlow2.htm). The
author will adhere to his own imaginary version.
9 The following description was largely true in relation to the end-users of copyright artefacts,
consumers, but was less true of various categories of intermediaries who licensed the uses of copy-
right works.
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"infringing uses" which involved "copying" and a limited number of forms
of communication. Consequently, who read a book (or watched a film),
how often, when and where was generally none of the author's business.
5 Loans of copyright artefacts to others to use were generally beyond the
control or knowledge of copyright owners. Where intermediaries such
as libraries or video rental stores did keep records of borrowings, these
could result in privacy invasions, but usually not by or for the copy-
right owners.
6 Enforcement of copyright - detection of and action against infringing
uses - was therefore not a by-product of routine surveillance of all uses
of copyright works, but usually a matter of selective surveillance and
periodic detection (ex post facto). Enforcement in "real time"
(simultaneous with attempted infringement) was generally impossible.
7 There were various types of "fair use" of copyright artefacts (uses which
would normally constitute infringements but under certain conditions
did not) which did not require the user to seek any licence from the
copyright owner or even communicate to the copyright owner that the
use was taking place. "Fair use" could also be private use.
8 Some types of infringement would only occur where the act concerned
was "in public" (or some similar formulation), effectively creating vari-
ous types of "private spheres" outside the scope of copyright laws.'
Although these exceptions to copyright for "private use" are the most
obvious form in which copyright law accommodated privacy, it is a mis-
take to exaggerate their importance." In comparison, the default
condition of anonymity in the normal use of copyright artefacts is more
important.
Over centuries, a balance was formed between the interests of copyright
owners to be aware of infringements and the ability of users to experience
intellectual works in private. A traditional right to enjoy works in private
resulted. Being able to read or view works free from surveillance is an impor-
tant support for freedom of conscience, freedom of expression and a democratic
society.12 The new technological protections of copyright are altering this
balance.
10 See Lee Bygrave and Kamiel Koelman, Privacy, Data Protection and Copyright: Their Interaction in the
Context of Electronic Copyright Management Systems, (report commissioned for the Imprimatur project)
(Institute for Information Law, University of Amsterdam, June 1998), http://folk.uio.no/lee/articles/
ECMS_1mprimatur.pdf; see also their chapter in Hugenholtz (ed), Copyright and Electronic Com-
merce (Deventer: Kluwer, 2000) for examples.
11 Ibid., Ch 5 stresses this reason, giving too little weight to the factors mentioned earlier.
12 As Bygrave notes in Lee Bygrave, "The technologisation of copyright: Implications for privacy and
related interests" (2002) 24(2) European Intellectual Property Review 51, part of the function of pri-
vacy laws is to protect "the incentive to participate in a democratic, pluralist society by securing the
privacy, autonomy and integrity of individuals".
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It is possible to argue" from an economic analysis of copyright law that
such limitations on exploitation of copyright as those outlined above that
support respect for privacy are merely a result of previously high transaction
costs which DRMS can eliminate. However, they can also be seen as a means
of reconciling the loss to the public welfare caused by the monopoly involved
in copyright. At least because there is not yet "any well-functioning competi-
tion between different DRM systems", and for other reasons, many argue that
the law has to limit the extent of protection that DRMS can provide. 14 The
author of this article agrees, and takes the same approach to the need for law
to balance protection of privacy against the protection of digital content.
Technologies and Systems for Copyright Protection
Pervasive Networking of Digital Artefacts
Kevin Kelly" thought that:
"the trajectory is clear. We are connecting all to everything.
As we implant a billion specks of our thought into everything we make,
we are also connecting them up. Stationary objects are wired together.
The nonstationary rest - that is, most manufactured objects - will be linked
by infrared and radio, creating a wireless web vastly larger than the wired
web. It is not necessary that each connected object transmit much data. A
tiny chip plastered inside a water tank on an Australian ranch transmits
only the telegraphic message of whether it is full or not. A chip on the
horn of each steer beams out his pure location, nothing more: 'I'm here,
I'm here.' The chip in the gate at the end of the road communicates only
when it was last opened: 'Tuesday."'
Pervasive networking enables a trend toward artefacts that report back
through these digital networks to some central monitoring point about their
location, current state or prior usage, often in a way which allows that infor-
mation to be correlated, more or less reliably, with the actions of individual
people. Artefacts are often built with surveillance capacities enabled in default,
sometimes with an "opt out" capability.
13 The summary of these arguments on which this is based are from part 6.1.1 of Stefan Bechtold,
"From Copyright to Information Law - Implications of Digital Rights Management", Workshop on
Security and Privacy in Digital Rights Management 2001 (Philadelphia, USA, 5 Nov 2001), http://
www.star-lab.com/sander/spdrm/papers/bechtold.pdf.
14 Ibid., the conclusion reached by Bechtold.
15 Kevin Kelly, "New Rules for the New Economy" Wired Archive 5.09, Sept 1997, http://www.wired.
com/wired/5.09/newrules.html.
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To see that many digital artefacts do live in a networked world is simple
enough. Many people now have Internet connections active whenever they
are using their computers. Every program, document or other file on their
computer is then (in theory) capable of communicating with anywhere else
on the Internet, such as the computer system of its copyright owner or of an
intermediary in a DRMS. Furthermore, many digital artefacts have their full
utility only when their users are online. An obvious example is that word
processing documents are now created routinely with live hypertext links, so
that the document is interactive if opened when the user's personal computer
(PC) is online, but not otherwise. Another example is software for playing
recorded music which, when a music compact disc (CD) is inserted in a PC,
automatically checks an Internet database to obtain the title and other de-
tails of all the tracks on the CD.16 The telecommunications infrastructure for
digital artefacts to exercise surveillance is, therefore, an increasingly perva-
sive part of our computer use.
Many hardware devices used to present digital content are not yet net-
worked (at least not so as to allow two-way communication), including most
CD and digital video disc (DVD) players, and televisions. However, the range
of hardware devices used for presenting content with wired or wireless com-
munications capacities is growing rapidly, including mobile phones and
personal digital assistants (PDAs). This article concentrates on digital con-
tent which is already part of the increasing pervasive networking, because
that is where the privacy issues are most acute.
Online surveillance through the use of "cookies" I6 A and "web bugs" 1B
(single pixel gifs) has already become a contentious privacy issue, but these
examples relate more to marketing uses of our browsing habits than to the
conditions of use of IP.
Our rights to limit surveillance via artefacts will become one of the key
privacy issues for the start of this century, with surveillance by digital works
likely to be one of the most contentious and common examples.
16 Apple's iMusic software and its use of the CDDB database is one example.
16A "A cookie is information that a Web site puts on your hard disk so that it can remember something
about you at a later time." (from Whatis?com definition), see http://searchSecurity.techtarget.com/
sDefinition/O,,sidl4_gci2l1838,00.html.
16B "A Web bug is a file object, usually a graphic image such as a transparent one-pixel-by-one pixel GIF,
that is placed on a Web page or in an e-mail message to monitor user behavior, functioning as a kind
of spyware. Unlike a cookie, which can be accepted or declined by a browser user, a Web bug arrives as
just another GIF on the Web page. A Web bug is typically invisible to the user because it is transparent
(matches the color of the page background) and takes up only a tiny amount of space." (from Whatis?
com definition), see http://searchWebManagement.techtarget.com/sDefinition/0,,sid27_gci341290,00.
html.
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The new paradigm for content protection
The new paradigm which is emerging for the protection of digital content is
not simply a matter of technology being used to protect copyright works. It is
summarised in the diagram below, which can be used to represent the rela-
tionships between content owners and the three types of parties whose conduct
they need to regulate in order to maintain control over the content they
provide, and obtain revenues from it. Four distinct methods of regulating
those relationships are now used, in complex combinations.
The three types of parties are:
1 Content consumers - Content owners aim to ensure that the end-users
of their works observe any requirements that the content owner im-
poses on the use of the work, including payment conditions. As well as
consumers who have purchased copies, content owners want to
l measures
rotection legislation
ection legislation
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enforce these conditions against other users such as illegal copiers and
borrowers.
2 Consumer hardware manufacturers - Content owners need to ensure
that manufacturers of hardware that present their digital works are con-
sistent with and do not circumvent any content protection technologies
they use with their works. They want to stop any hardware manufac-
turers from making or dealing in hardware that will circumvent their
content protection measures.
3 Content intermediaries - Content owners also need to ensure that those
who distribute their content do not distribute pirate copies, or do any-
thing that interferes with their content protection measures.
In order to obtain the protection that content owners want in relation to
digital content, they are relying on complex combinations of at least four
different forms of protection (possibly six, if different types of contracts are
distinguished)." These are:
1 Technological measures - CPT and DRMS are used to protect digital
content and metadata (RMI).
2 Contract - Content owners aim to enter contracts wherever possible
with each of the other three types of parties:
a "Click-wrap" contracts with consumers - In contrast to the past, the
use of DRMS allows content owners to require content consumers
to enter a contract before using a digital work, provided courts up-
hold the validity of "click-wrap licences"." Since it is possible to
include such click-wrap contracts in any on-line system, digital
artefact, or even hardware device, it is theoretically possible for con-
tent owners to ensure that all "users" of a work, including those
who borrow it to make an unauthorised copy of it, enter into a con-
tract with the copyright owner, making the provisions in a
DRMS-protected contract resemble a property right.19
b DRMS technology licences with hardware manufacturers - As Bechtold
has made clear, these licences are a crucial part of the protection
required by content owners before they will agree to distribute their
content in a format required by a particular DRMS." This diagram
17 The following analysis is influenced most strongly by Bechtold (n 13 above), though many other
authors have argued similarly. Bechtold adds the emphasis on technology licensing of hardware
manufacturers to previous analyses. The author has generalised the approach he takes at a number
of points.
18 A contract entered into by the consumer being required to agree to contractual terms, by clicking
an "I agree" button with a mouse, before the consumer can access the digital work; see ProCD, Inc v
Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) for the most significant US decision.
19 See Bechtold (n 13 above), part 3 and part 5.1.2 for a summary of this argument.
20 Ibid., part 4.
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is an over-simplification in this respect, because the DRMS devel-
oper is really a distinct party, but assumed here to be acting in
accordance with the content providers' wishes (as Bechtold sug-
gests is likely).
c Distribution licences with intermediaries - Content owners can use con-
tracts with intermediaries licensed to distribute their content to
ensure that technological protections are not weakened and RMI
not removed at the distribution stage, including to a stronger ex-
tent than is protected by technology protection laws.
3 Technology protection laws - Laws prohibiting acts of circumvention of
technology protecting digital content or metadata, or making, dealing
in or possessing such circumvention devices are not copyright law but
a new adjunct to it.
4 Content protection laws - Depending on how effective these other pro-
tections are, the significance of copyright law may be reduced. Bechtold
concludes that "the protection by traditional copyright law plays only
a minor role as a safety net".21 Database protection laws (required in
Europe but uncommon elsewhere) may also be relevant, so this ele-
ment is best called "content protection laws".
These protections are mutually supportive in complex ways. Technology
protection laws stop technological measures from being circumvented. The
comprehensive coverage of contract relationships with end-users can only be
achieved because technological measures stop the avoidance of "click-wrap"
contracts.
The same paradigm is being used to protect content which is not pro-
tected by copyright law, including the items of content in a database and
works which are in the public domain.
Most aspects of the very complex legal issues raised by the combinations
of these various protective measures are beyond the scope of this article, which
focuses only on the relationship between privacy protection and two of these
elements (technological measures and technology protection laws).
CPT
There are a wide variety of particular technologies and products which can
be used to protect digital content (CPT). They can be distinguished from
systems of content protection which are built around one or more of these
technologies and involve particular sets of participants (DRMS).
21 Ibid., part 8.
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These CPT can be categorised in various ways. Koelman and Helberger
distinguish those that control access, those that control certain uses, those
that protect the integrity of a work and those that enable metering of access
and / or use.22
For the purposes of this article, some of the more important of the variety of
CPT23 can be ranked in approximate order of their implications for privacy
(less to more):
1 Cryptographic "containers" which allow copies of works to be distrib-
uted widely but only used in full once a key has been obtained,24 or use
other metering methods restricting use without further payment
("superdistribution").25
2 Self-limiting works are works which "refuse" to allow actions which breach
the licence conditions of that particular copy of the work (part of Stefik's
"trusted systems") .26
3 Digital watermarks (and other forms of steganography) which embed
irremovable (and sometimes undetectable) information about rights
holders and / or licensees in each copy of the work.
4 "Trusted printing", where a work will not print (or otherwise copy) un-
less payment is first made for the copy, the work is sent to the "printer"
in encrypted form, and the copies are watermarked in some way. These
are part of "trusted systems".
5 Self-destructing works are works that cease to be useable after the expi-
ration of a licence or a breach of licence conditions, or until a further
licence is obtained.
6 Surveillance through use of existing Internet search engines to search for
infringing copies of works, using normal text searching techniques.
22 See part 2 of Kamiel Koelman and Natali Helberger, Protection of Technological Measures, Report
under the Imprimatur project (Institute for Information Law, University of Amsterdam, 1998),
available at http://www.ivir.nl/publications/koelman/technical.pdf.
23 This summary draws on discussions from the following articles: Koelman and Helberger (See n 22
above); Roger Clarke and Gillian Dempsey, "Electronic Trading in Copyright Objects and Its Im-
plications for Universities", Australian EDUCAUSE'99 Conference, Sydney, 18-21 Apr 1999, http:/
/www.anu.edu.au/people/Roger.Clarke/EC/ETCU.html; Mark Stefik, "Shifting The Possible: How
Trusted Systems And Digital Property Rights Challenge Us To Rethink Digital Publishing" (Spring
1997) 12 Berkeley Technology LawJournal 1, http://www.law.berkeley.edu/journals/btlj/articles/12_1/
Stefik/html/reader.html; Julie Cohen, "Some Reflections on Copyright Management Systems and
Laws Designed to Protect Them", (1997)12 Berkeley Tech. L.]. 161, http://www.law.berkeley.edu/
joumals/btlj/articles/12_1/Cohen/html/reader.html; International Federation of Reproduction Rights
Organisations (IFRRO), Committee On New Technologies, Digital Rights Management Technologies,
was, but no longer at http://www.ncri.com/articles/rights-management/.
24 For example, works protected by Softlock are freely copyable and partially readable "demos", but
become full-featured once a password is purchased. They automatically revert to demos when cop-
ied to another machine. Softlock's advertisement says: "turn pirates into distributors". Was on http:/
/www.softlock.com/, June 1998, now deleted.
25 Brad Cox, "Superdistribution" Wired Archive 2.09, Sept 1994, http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/
2.09/superdis.html.
26 See Stefik (n 23 above) and Mark Stefik, The Internet Edge (Boston: MIT Press, 1999).
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7 Customised "web spiders" that routinely trawl the web for information
identifying digital works (eg digital watermarks and other identifiers).
Such web spiders are in use17-12 by Broadcast Music Inc (BMI) and by
Digimark, a photo watermarking company acting on behalf of clients
such as Playboy.
8 Self-recording works are works that record details of when they are used
(including breaches of licence conditions). The International Federa-
tion of Reproduction Rights Organisations' (IFRRO) ideal system is
for "detecting, preventing, and counting a wide range of operations,
including open, print, export, copying, modifying, excerpting, and so
on", so that it "capturles] a record of what the user actually looked at,
copied or printed".
9 ID controls on central access to works in a central location, which re-
quire a password or some other form of identification before they can
be accessed.
10 Continuous monitoring of usage by online works using cookies and web
bugs to track all usage of online works resident on a publisher's com-
puter system. Cookie data will identify the user to the publisher each
time the user accesses a webpage, and web bugs (or "single pixel gifs")
can have a similar effect if a user's IP address can be correlated with an
individual user.
11 Continuous monitoring by works resident on a user's system of works that,
whenever they are online, send reports back to a central location online
concerning when they are used or copied, including to obtain "permis-
sion" to do so ("IP phone home"). IFRRO's3 ideal system sends "this
usage record ... to the clearinghouse when the user seeks additional
access, at the end of a billing period or whenever the user runs out of
credit."
This is an unsystematic and incomplete list of illustrations. Although there
are a bewildering variety of techniques and products that we could classify as
CPT, from the perspective of their significance for privacy protection, most
seem to combine a few basic elements:
1 Access controls - Controlling access to a work may be as simple as re-
quiring a password or only accepting http requests that come from
particular sub-domains, or it may require authentication of the enquirer
by a digital signature. Where copies of works are distributed, each copy
27-29 Charles C. Mann, "Who Will Own Your Next Good Idea?" The Atlantic Monthly, Part II, (Sept
1998), http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/98sep/copy2.htm.
30 International Federation of Reproduction Rights Organisations (IFRRO), see http://www.ifrro.org/.
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may require a separate encryption key to access it (eg "cryptolopes").
Works may be such that they "refuse" to allow various forms of use
(printing, "cut and paste", use beyond a certain date, etc) unless cer-
tain conditions are met. These are more sophisticated forms of access
control.
2 Identification in the work - There are many techniques for embedding
meta-information (information about the work) in the work itself, and
many types of information embedded, from static information identi-
fying the work, its licensee or licence conditions, to dynamic
information that is updated as the work is used.
3 Surveillance - Whatever technologies are used, rights owners (or inter-
mediaries representing them) often need some form of active
surveillance of access to and use of the work, either in order to utilise
their rights under copyright law, or for the digital work to execute its
own remedies (eg "refusing" to operate), or to grant or refuse licences.
The information needed is typically stored in the work itself, but the
rights-owner must access it either through "pull" methods (eg search
engines and web spiders) or "push" methods (eg cookies and other means
of sending data back to a central point).
DRMS
Individual CPT are important, but they are not the key element in the
cyberspace architecture that is being developed to protect IP. What may make
architecture replace law as the principal protection of digital works is a com-
mon framework for the trading of IPR, both between businesses and to
end-users, a set of standards within which all of the particular CPT can work.
DRMS may take many forms, depending in part on which combination of
CPTs are employed. In addition, the business models which will become com-
mercially successful are still emerging.
The "ideal aims" of a DRMS have been described (in a formulation more
sympathetic to consumer and privacy rights than most product descriptions)"
as follows:
1 to provide copyright-protected material to users upon request;
2 to provide a means for remuneration (or a facility to grant or refuse a
licence) to flow to the owner;
3 to track usage of material (which documents, how often, used by whom
and so on) without interfering with the privacy of the user;
4 to prevent unlawful appropriation of the copyright material by people
who are outside the system;
31 Was on Australia's Cultural Network site at http://www.acn.net.au/resources/ip/ecms.htm, now
deleted.
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5 to prevent unlawful use of the copyright material by users who obtain
the material legitimately in the first instance;
6 to ensure the integrity of the IP;
7 to allow for a reasonable flow of information between owners to users
(owners are often also users and vice versa) in the public interest (that
is, a DRMS should not unreasonably tie up the community's informa-
tion and cultural resources); and
8 to allow for the effective operation of fair dealing within the DRMS.
The potential for privacy intrusions is apparent from the third, fourth and
fifth aims, even in this "ideal" description.
A description of one of the best-known early DRMS models, the Euro-
pean Imprimatur Project,32 illustrates how some fundamental changes to the
way in which copyright currently operates would follow from the implemen-
tation of such a DRMS:
1 Each digital work is issued with a unique identification number," which
is then inserted by the content provided as microcode in the work to
enable it to be tracked in various situations. See below concerning the
range of identification systems emerging.
2 There is an intellectual property rights (IPR) database, "somewhat similar
in content and function to a land title registry", enabling anyone
(particularly potential purchasers) to verify a digital work's identifica-
tion and legal status.
3 There is a monitoring service provider (MSP) which, on behalf of cre-
ators and rights holders, will (though the summary does not say this)
monitor transactions, uses and breaches (depending on the technology)
of rights in digital artefacts. MSPs will use a variety of mechanisms,
32 In Europe, the Imprimatur project, sponsored by the European Commission (EC), developed the
Imprimatur Business Model. Bygrave and Koelman (n 10 above) describe the actors and inter-
relationships in the model at p 3:
"In brief, the role of the creation provider (CP) is analogous to that of a publisher; ie, he / she /
it packages the original work into a marketable product. The role of the media distributor
(MD) is that of a retailer; ie, he / she / it vends various kinds of rights with respect to usage of
the product. The role of the unique number issuer (UNI) is analogous to the role of the issuer of
ISBN codes; ie, it provides the CP with a unique number to insert in the product as microcode
so that the product and its rights-holders can be subsequently identified for the purposes of
royalty payments. The role of the IPR database provider is to store basic data on the legal status
of the products marketed by the MD. These data concern the identity of each product and its
current rights-holder. The main purpose of the database is to provide verification of a product's
legal status to potential purchasers of a right with respect to usage of the product. As such, the
IPR database is somewhat similar in content and function to a land title register. The role of
the monitoring service provider (MSP) is to monitor, on behalf of creators / copyright-holders,
what purchasers acquire from MDs. Finally, the certification authority (CA) is intended to
assure any party to an ECMS operation of the authenticity of the other parties whom he / she /
it deals. Thus, the CA fulfils the role of trusted third party (TTP)."
33 See Bygrave and Koelman (n 10 above), p 7.
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including reporting from Media Distributors, and surveillance of the
web through the use of search engines, customised web spiders, and
digital artefacts that report on their own usage.
4 Certification Authorities (CAs) play a major role, as it is assumed that
both parties to transactions, and the authenticity of communications
from them will be routinely identified by digital signatures, and so veri-
fication by CAs is needed.
This blueprint for the networked DRMS architecture in which IP transac-
tions will operate in cyberspace could hardly be more different from the current
world of books, videos and CDs. As regulation, this "code" (in Lessig's
terminology) shares few similarities with IP law. This is not necessarily a
criticism, merely an observation of how powerful and different architecture
as regulation will be in IP.
Standards and pervasiveness
The success, importance and privacy dangers of networked DRMS is likely to
depend, in large part, on the extent to which they achieve interoperability
between multiple publishers (within one DRMS), and ultimately, between
different DRMS and different media types. The greater the degree of
interoperability, the greater the potential for aggregation of personal infor-
mation concernmg our consumption of digital content.
One of the key standards is for identification of digital works. Gervais"
described 11 competing standards, including a variety of media-specific
identifiers, and more general proposals such as the Digital Object Identifier
(DOI)" and Persistent Uniform Resource Locators (PURLs).36 He also de-
scribed five standards for metadata3 1 that (in the absence of one global
identification system for digital works emerging) might provide a basis for
3 Daniel J. Gervais, "Electronic Rights Management and Digital Identifier Systems" (1998) 4(2), The
Journal of Electronic Publishing, http://www.press.umich.edu/jep/04-03/gervais.html (visited 22 June
1999).
1 "A DOI (digital object identifier) is a permanent identifier given to a Web file or other Internet
document so that if its Internet address changes, users will be redirected to its new address. You
submit a DOI to a centrally-managed directory and then use the address of that directory plus the
DOI instead of a regular Internet address. The DOI system was conceived by the Association of
American Publishers in partnership with the Corporation for National Research Initiatives and is
now administered by the International DOI Foundation. Essentially, the DOI system is a scheme for
Web page redirection by a central manager." (from Whatiscom definition), see http://whatis.
techtarget.com/definition/0,,sid9_gci213897,00.html.
36 "Functionally, a PURL is a URL. However, instead of pointing directly to the location of an Internet
resource, a PURL points to an intermediate resolution service. The PURL resolution service associ-
ates the PURL with the actual URL and returns that URL to the client. The client can then
complete the URL transaction in the normal fashion. In Web parlance, this is a standard HTTP
redirect." (from PURL homepage), see http://www.purl.org/.
37 Dublin Core, US MARC, INDECS Project, Stanford Digital Library Metadata Architecture,
BIBLINK/NEDLIB.
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interoperability between DRMS based around different numbering systems.
DOI and PURL also have the potential to unify differing numbering systems
without replacing them.
This Babel of identifications for digital works is as yet slowing down the
development of networked DRMS, and this slow development buys a limited
amount of time for privacy protection to be developed.
Privacy and Related Issues in CPT and DRMS
Online surveillance of users of digital works involves a variety of privacy dan-
gers which are summarised in this section, starting with the most general, and
proceeding to issues of technology design.
Monitoring of reading and viewing habits poses the threat of a "chilling
effect" on freedom to read, think and speak. Cohen describes it as "a giant leap ...
toward monitoring human thought"."8 Bygrave and Koelman argue that
"[tihe attendant, long-term implications of this for the vitality of pluralist,
democratic society are obvious".39
The collection of information on reading and viewing habits creates risks
of the misuse of personal information for secondary purposes, particularly, but
not only, marketing purposes. These risks are amplified if those collecting
personal information can aggregate data from our reading / viewing different
sources, so as to construct profiles. The use of reading / viewing information
for marketing purposes is obvious. Non-marketing examples of unacceptable
38 Julie Cohen, speaking mainly of the IFRRO's notion of an ideal DRMS, concludes in Julie Cohen,
"A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at 'copyright management' in Cyberspace", (1996)
28 Conn. L. Rev. 981, http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/property/altemative/Cohen.html:
"These capabilities, if realized, threaten individual privacy to an unprecedented degree. Al-
though credit-reporting agencies and credit card providers capture various facets of one's
commercial life, CMS raise the possibility that someone might capture a fairly complete picture
of one's intellectual life.
Reading, listening, and viewing habits reveal an enormous amount about individual opinions,
beliefs, and tastes, and may also reveal an individual's association with particular causes and
organizations. Equally important, reading, listening, and viewing contribute to an ongoing pro-
cess of intellectual evolution. Individuals do not arrive in the world with their beliefs and
opinions fully-formed; rather, beliefs and opinions are formed and modified over time, through
exposure to information and other external stimuli. Thus, technologies that monitor reading,
listening, and viewing habits represent a giant leap - whether forward or backward the reader
may decide - toward monitoring human thought. The closest analogue, the library check-out
record, is primitive by comparison. And library check-out records are subject to stringent pri-
vacy laws in most states." (footnotes omitted).
39 Bygrave and Koelman (n 10 above), while not opposed to DRMS, stress that the surveillance dan-
gers are one of the most significant obstacles to their acceptable operation:
" ... such systems could facilitate the monitoring of what people privately read, listen to, or view,
in a manner that is both more fine-grained and automated than previously practised. This
surveillance potential may not only weaken the privacy of information consumers but also
function as a form for thought control, weighing down citizens with "the subtle, imponderable
pressures of the orthodox", and thereby inhibiting the expression of non-conformist opinions
and preferences. In short, an ECMS could function as a kind of digital Panopticon. The attendant,
long-term implications of this for the vitality of pluralist, democratic society are obvious."
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secondary uses are that researchers or lawyers do not want anyone to know
what digital works they are consulting, and an author wanting permission to
include an extract in an anthology or other collection does not want his or
her publishing plans indirectly disclosed to rival publishers.
Minimising unnecessary identification is a significant issue. There is a need
to maximise the use of CPT which allow anonymous transactions involving
digital works, provided that in doing so we don't create worse problems of
unfair contract enforcement (see below). Otherwise, when it is necessary for
transactions to be potentially identifiable, pseudonymity needs to be used
wherever possible,40 to prevent the misuse of personal information for sec-
ondary purposes, and also to prevent a "chilling effect" on freedom to read,
think and speak.
Intermediaries between users and rights owners will play a crucial role in
safeguarding and administering pseudonymity, and in aggregating usage in-
formation for publishers and authors without interfering with user privacy."
Many CPT can be and will be used without any intermediaries between the
end-user of a digital work and the rights-holder. "Disintermediation" was one
of the buzzwords of Internet business models. In its positive incarnations, we
think of recording artists or authors being able to sell directly to their publics.
Just as likely, publishing houses of various sorts (still the rights-holders) will
40 Gervais (n 34 above) describes the role of pseudonymity in the proper operation of DRMS:
"A related issue is how to identify individual digital copies (which presumably have been sold to a
specific user), without creating a risk to privacy or confidentiality. If indeed individual copies are
identified, using a watermark containing a transaction code for instance, a viable solution could
be to number individual copies, without including data identifying the user who 'ordered' the
copy in question. Copy numbers could be linked, in a secure database, to the individual users.
Should there be a good reason to make the link between the copy number and the user - for
instance, under court order - that link could be made. The role of trusted third parties acting as
aggregators of usage data might be especially important to users. An aggregator or collective man-
agement organization using an electronic copyright-management system could thus maintain the
confidentiality of the link (if any) between a given copy delivered on-line and a specific user. The
content owner would receive with the payment for use of his works a report on the number of
uses, possibly with an indication of the type of users concerned, but no information about indi-
vidual users. Without this type of confidentiality guarantee, it may be very difficult for electronic
copyright commerce to prosper. In other words, properly tuned electronic copyright-management
systems that aggregate data so as to protect privacy and confidentiality are probably essential
ingredients of the success of electronic copyright commerce."
41 Gervais (n 34 above), a proponent of DRMS, emphasises the crucial role that DRMS intermediar-
ies (such as MSPs and CAs in the Imprimatur model) will have in the protection of privacy:
"An electronic copyright-management system does not in and by itself protect privacy, but it is
probably the best tool to do so. If the rules under which the electronic copyright-management
system operates are correctly designed, the system would return to rights holders aggregated
information on use of his / her works. For example, the system could say that clearance was
granted to use 'Scientific Article X' to'll pharmaceutical companies in the last month', or that
'2,345 users in this part of Chicago' downloaded a given musical work. The rights holder thus
gets market data without violating anyone's confidentiality or privacy. Even now the Copy-
right Clearance Center in the U.S. does not report to rights holders which articles from medical
or scientific journals are used by individual users (eg., pharmaceutical companies). It only tells
rights holders how often a work was used by, say, the pharmaceutical industry as a whole. Most
collective management organizations aggregate information in this way and this is perhaps a
function whose value has thus far been underestimated by users."
50 Graham Greenleaf (2002) HKLJ
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do a far greater percentage of direct selling to the public without the use of
intermediaries such as booksellers. Online booksellers could also develop into
intermediaries for digital works in a DRMS model. The result is likely to be a
mixture of delivery models, but the point is that a lot of CPT and DRMS will
be run directly by publishing houses with lots of different products to shift
and a strong interest in secondary use of identified consumption data, or by
booksellers with a similar combination of interests. We will not always be
"lucky" enough either to have some central industry-based monitoring body
standing between consumers and publishers trying to act as an "honest broker",
or to be dealing directly with the author who has only his or her own product
to sell. Which business models succeed will have a significant effect on privacy.
Related Consumer Issues: "Fair Use" and Fair Enforcement
Privacy is not the only issue raised by DRMS, nor perhaps even the most
important one. The architecture of DRMS need not observe any of the pub-
lic interest limitations built into copyright law. These include the right to
lend a work for use by others (the basis of libraries - the "first sale doctrine"),
and the various "fair dealing" rights to copy works or parts thereof for pur-
poses such as "criticism and review" or "private study and research". As Lessig
puts it, "what the law reserves as a limitation on the property holder's rights
the code could ignore".42 If dealings in relation to digital works become di-
rect transactions where it is practical for the rights-owner to enter into a
contract with the user (unlike the purchase of a book in a store), then such
contracts are likely to routinely exclude such public interest exceptions. As
observed earlier, fair use was traditionally exercised in private, so privacy in-
terests are also relevant here.
The enforcement of such contracts is also unlike real space contracts, Lessig
points out,4 because whereas the law always takes into account various public
and private interests in determining the extent and means by which contracts
will be enforced, when contracts are self-enforced by code (for example, by the
work suddenly becoming unusable) these public values are not likely to be taken
into account. We might add that when the law enforces a contract, there is an
independent assessment of whether there has been a breach of the contract,
whereas here the enforcement is automated and unilateral, built into the
architecture. If "code contracts" replace law, these are not necessarily the same
as "law contracts", and may not be in the public interest. There is also likely to
be an overlap with privacy interests here, because of the surveillance involved
in determining where there has been a breach.
42 Lessig (n 5 above). Lessig also notes an extensive argument in the US as to whether "the fair use
exceptions to copyright protection are not affirmative rights against the copyright holder, but in-
stead the consequence of not being able to efficiently meter usage. Once that technical limitation is
erased, then so too would the fair use rights be erased."
43 Lessig (n 5 above).
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Laws Against Circumvention - Beyond Copyright?
The recent amendments to copyright legislation in some jurisdictions which
provide legislative prohibitions against copyright circumvention devices and
against the removal of RMI are implementations of the WCT and the WIPO
Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT). National implementations of
the Treaty are the first general legislative protections given to CPT and DRMS,
by the negative device of preventing their circumvention or removal.4 There
have previously been less systematic or general attempts in some jurisdictions,
amounting to a "modest body of law".41
Although often phrased in terms of protecting copyright, they are of broader
significance as one means by which authors can protect an expanded set of
rights beyond copyright through a combination of contracts, technology and
surveillance.
The WCT
Article 11 of the WCT6 provides, in relation to copyright circumvention devices:
"Contracting Parties shall provide adequate legal protection and effective
legal remedies against the circumvention of effective technological mea-
sures that are used by authors in connection with the exercise of their
rights under this Treaty or the Berne Convention and that restricts acts,
in respect of their works, which are not authorised by the authors con-
cerned or permitted by law."
Article 12 of the WCT provides, in relation to RMI:
"(1) Contracting Parties shall provide adequate and effective legal remedies
against any person knowingly performing any of the following acts
knowing, or with respect to civil remedies having reasonable grounds
to know, that it will induce, enable, facilitate or conceal an infringe-
ment of any right covered by this Treaty or the Berne Convention:
(i) to remove or alter any electronic RMI without authority;
(ii) to distribute, import for distribution, broadcast or communi-
cate to the public, without authority, works or copies of works
knowing that electronic RMI has been removed or altered with-
out authority.
44 They are also an instance of laws facilitating surveillance which we can describe as "data surveil-
lance law."
45 Koelman and Helberger (n 22 above), part 3.1 note a number of US, UK and EU provisions which
deal only with some types of circumvention, or specific types of works.
46 The WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Art 18 is a very similar provision, but the dis-
cussion in this paper will only refer to the WCT, Art 11.
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(2) As used in this Article, 'rights management information' means in-
formation which identifies the work, the author of the work, the
owner of any right in the work, or information about the terms and
conditions of use of the work, and any numbers or codes that repre-
sent such information, when any of these items of information is
attached to a copy of a work or appears in connection with the
communication of a work to the public."
From the perspective of privacy protection, some of the questions we need
to ask are whether these provisions and their national legislative implemen-
tations allow persons to:
1 delete from digital works personal information that facilitates
surveillance;
2 prevent a web robot from looking for infringing artefacts; or
3 prevent a digital work from communicating information over the
Internet.
Hong Kong and Australia as Examples of Implementation
National implementations of the WCT are what is crucial, and they may
take a conservative or an expansive approach to what the WCT requires. In
the following sections, we will take Australia and Hong Kong as examples of
implementation.
In 1998, the Australian government announced its plans to ban commer-
cial dealings in circumvention devices and to ban removal of RMI. 7 The
proposed amendments drew heavily on what was then the proposed Euro-
pean Commission (EC) Directive.48 The amendments to the Copyright Act
1968 (Cth) by the Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) Act 2000 have
been in force since March 2001.
The Hong Kong SAR has provisions with the same intent in sections
273-274 of the Copyright Ordinance (Cap 528) which was enacted in 1997,
shortly after the finalisation of the WCT.
The United States' Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) of 1998
has amended Title 17 of the US Code (dealing with copyright) to implement
the WCT. The EC Directive on Copyright in the Information Society, which
47 See Commonwealth Attorney-General's Discussion Paper The Digital Agenda (1998) "Part 5 - Pro-
posed scheme for new technological measures and rights management information provisions", http:/
/law.gov.au/publications/digital.htm#anchor565870. See also Speech by Attorney-General D.
Williams, "Copyright and the Internet: New Government reforms", para 35, Murdoch University,
30 Apr 1998, http://law.gov.au/articles/copyrightjinternet.html.
48 Proposed EC Directive on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in
the Information Society - see Arts 6 and 7 - now Directive 2001/29/EC.
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deals with anti-circumvention and RMI issues primarily in Articles 6 and 7,
was passed in May 2001.4' Both are only mentioned briefly by way of
comparison, particularly where they take a different approach to privacy-re-
lated issues.
Anti-circumvention - Australian and Hong Kong Provisions
Australia
Section 116A provides"o that a copyright owner or exclusive licensee has a
right of action (section 116A(5)) against a person who makes, sells or other-
wise deals in various specified ways with "a circumvention device" capable
of circumventing, or facilitating the circumvention" of "technological pro-
tection measures", or a "circumvention service" 52 with a similar capability.
Defendants are only liable if they knew or ought reasonably to have known
that the device or service would be used "to circumvent, or facilitate the
circumvention of, the technological protection measure" (section 116A(1)).
49 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the
harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society (O.J. L
167, 22 June 2001, p 10 et seq.); for analysis, see Bygrave (n 12 above) and Kamiel Koelman, "A
hard nut to crack: The protection of technological measures" (2000) European Intellectual Property
Review 227, draft available at http://www.ivir.nl/publications/koelman/hardnut.html.
50 Section 1 16A(1) sets out the scope of the right:
"sl16A(1) Subject to subsections (2), (3) and (4), this section applies if:
(a) a work or other subject-matter is protected by a technological protection measure; and
(b) a person does any of the following acts without the permission of the owner or exclusive
licensee of the copyright in the work or other subject-matter:
(i) makes a circumvention device capable of circumventing, or facilitating the circum-
vention of, the technological protection measure;
(ii) sells, lets for hire, or by way of trade offers or exposes for sale or hire or otherwise
promotes, advertises or markets, such a circumvention device;
(iii) distributes such a circumvention device for the purpose of trade, or for any other
purpose that will affect prejudicially the owner of the copyright;
(iv) exhibits such a circumvention device in public by way of trade;
(v) imports such a circumvention device into Australia for the purpose of:
(vi) makes such a circumvention device available online to an extent that will affect
prejudicially the owner of the copyright;
(vii) provides, or by way of trade promotes, advertises or markets, a circumvention service
capable of circumventing, or facilitating the circumvention of, the technological
protection measure; and
(c) the person knew, or ought reasonably to have known, that the device or service would be used
to circumvent, or facilitate the circumvention of, the technological protection measure."
51 Section 10 defines "circumvention device": "circumvention device means a device having only a
limited commercially significant purpose or use, or no such purpose or use, other than the
circumvention, or facilitating the circumvention, of an effective technological protection
measure."
52 Section 10 defines "circumvention service": "circumvention service means a service, the performance
of which has only a limited commercially significant purpose, or no such purpose or use, other than
the circumvention, or facilitating the circumvention, of an effective technological protection
measure."
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A "technological protection measure" means (section 10):
" ... a device or product, or a component incorporated into a process, that
is designed, in the ordinary course of its operation, to prevent or inhibit
the infringement of copyright in a work or other subject-matter by either
or both of the following means:
(a) by ensuring that access to the work or other subject-matter is avail-
able solely by use of an access code or process (including decryption,
unscrambling or other transformation of the work or other subject-
matter) with the authority of the owner or licensee of the copyright;
(b) through a copy control mechanism."
Where section 116A applies, the copyright owner may obtain an
injunction, damages (including additional damages) or an account of profits
(section 116D). There is also a criminal offence where the same conditions as
in section 116A are satisfied, but with a higher burden of proof ("reckless"
rather than "ought reasonably to have known") and with the onus of proof on
the Crown (sections 132(5A)-(5B)). A similar offence is created in relation
to the operation of a "circumvention service" (sections 132(5C)-(5D)).
Hong Kong
Hong Kong's anti-circumvention provisions53 are very different from Australia's
in form. Section 273 provides remedies against "a person who, knowing or hav-
ing reason to believe that it will be used to make infringing copies" deals with
(in various ways) or possesses "for the purpose of, in the course of, or in connec-
tion with, any trade or business, any device or means specifically designed or
adapted to circumvent the form of copy-protection employed" or "publishes
information intended to enable or assist persons to circumvent that form of
copy-protection". "Copy-protection" includes "any device or means specifically
intended to prevent or restrict copying of a work or fixation of a performance or
to impair the quality of copies or fixations made".
Anti-circumvention: Analysis of the Provisions
The effects of section 116A (Australia) and of section 273 (Hong Kong) are
complex, particularly in relation to privacy interests. In the points following,
the author attempts to identify some of the main implications, and unre-
solved issues, arising from section 11 6A, and compare them with the equivalent
position in section 273.
5 References following are to the Copyright Ordinance (Cap 528).
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Users will usually be liable, even though the act of circumvention is not a breach
In Australia, it is not a breach of section 116A to use a circumvention device,
or to possess one. Nor is the act of circumvention itself covered by these
provisions. Only making and dealing in such devices is proscribed. Similarly,
although provision of a "circumvention service" is actionable (and a criminal
offence), it is not actionable (or an offence) simply to use such a service.
Similarly, in Hong Kong it is not a breach of section 273 to use a circumven-
tion device per se. It is a breach to possess such a device knowing it will be
used for circumvention, but only if this is "in the course of, or in connection
with, any trade or business" (section 273(2)(a)). "Private", non-business pos-
session is, therefore, outside the Hong Kong provisions, but possession by
business users is included. In contrast, both the DCMA and the EC copyright
Directive prohibit the act of circumvention (with some exceptions).
However, it is misleading to think that users in Hong Kong and Australia
will not usually be liable for acts of circumvention. The use of a circumven-
tion device will involve liability for breach of copyright by the user, if it
involves the making of an infringing reproduction ("copies" in Hong Kong
terminology). This may occur in two ways.
First, many, if not most, digital works cannot be used without a transient
copy of the work being made by the hardware device used to display the work.
However, in Australia, in some cases, such as playing movies embodied in
DVDs, these transient copies will not constitute a "copy" under section 10:
Australian Video Retailers v Warner." In addition, section 43A provides that,
even where the transient copying of a work (literary, dramatic, musical or
artistic) which occurs during use is a reproduction, it is not an infringement if
it is made "as part of the technical process of making or receiving a communi-
cation" (unless "the making of the communication is an infringement of
copyright"). While this means that web browsing does not infringe copyright,
it does not assist a user who is using a circumvention device which results in
a reproduction (even if temporary) being made of a copyright work. The user
would be liable for a copyright infringement unless a defence applied (such as
one of the fair use defences), the work was in the public domain, or an im-
plied licence still applied." The Australian situation is, therefore, complex.
In Hong Kong, section 65 provides that transient copies of every type of
subject matter are not infringing if "technically required for the viewing or
listening of the work by a member of the public to whom a copy of the work
is made available", despite section 23 providing that such copies are
infringements. This implies that, provided a user has legitimately obtained a
5 Australian Video Retailers Association Ltd v Warner Home Video Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 1719.
55 It seems unlikely that an implied licence would still operate under circumstances of attempted
circumvention.
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copy of a work, making a temporary copy of it for purposes of viewing or
listening, in the course of use of a circumvention device, would not consti-
tute infringement. Even where section 65 does not apply, there might be no
infringement by playing DVDs, despite section 23(6),56 because no "making
of copies" is involved: Australian Video Retailers v Warner.
Second, it is quite possible that the use of a circumvention device will
require the copying and / or adaptation of software or data comprised in the
CPT / DRMS which is protected by copyright. Such copying will probably
fall outside the protection for transient copies (section 65 and section 43A
discussed above) because it is not for "receiving a communication" or "view-
ing or listening". It does not come within the exceptions for copying software
for such purposes as error correction in either the Hong Kong or Australian
legislation. 7 However, some uses of circumvention could arguably involve
copying programs in ways which are "for the purposes for which the program
was designed" (Australia, section 47B) or "necessary for the lawful use of the
program" (Hong Kong, section 61). In both jurisdictions, use of the circum-
vention device could result in an infringing copy of software, but it is difficult
to generalise.
Furthermore, a question remains as to whether a person who writes his or
her own small piece of software in order to prevent some surveillance device
operating as it is intended might be regarded as "making" a device.
An additional risk is that, where a digital work is provided online by some-
one else, use of a circumvention device or service to obtain unauthorised
access to a computer system could also involve criminal offences."
We can conclude that, although use of circumvention devices is not ex-
plicitly prohibited, in both Australia and Hong Kong, users need (but do not
have) a positive statutory "right to circumvent" in order to be able to safely
access a digital work for purposes which would provide a defence to an action
for infringement. Such a right should be provided by law.
"Upstream" prohibitions can make user rights meaningless
The focus on the "upstream" providers of circumvention devices or services
in both Australia and Hong Kong, rather than the "downstream" use of such
devices or services (or circumvention per se) appears at first to be one of the
most significant limits on the scope of these provisions, though as we have
already seen that users will often be liable.
However, as Koelman argues in the European context, "too broad a prohi-
bition on preparatory activities would render the permission to circumvent
56 Section 23(6) states: "Copying in relation to any description of work includes the making of copies
which are transient or are incidental to some other use of the work".
57 Sections 60-61 Hong Kong and ss 47AB-47H Australia.
58 The scope of the "computer crime" laws of Australia and Hong Kong is not covered in this article.
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meaningless"". The discussion following supports this hypothesis in relation
to Australia and Hong Kong.
Effects much broader than preventing copyright breaches
Under section 1 16A (Australia), the essence of a breach is to make or deal in
a device / service capable of circumventing or facilitating the circumvention
of a "technological protection measure", knowing or reasonably suspecting it
would be so used. For a number of reasons, this provision can be used to
prevent conduct which has little to do with a breach of copyright.
First, in the definition of "technological protection measure", provided
that an "access control" or "copy control" measure does have some effect in
"inhibiting" copyright infringements, it is not necessary that this should be
its primary purpose. Many access control or copy control mechanisms would
at least "inhibit" copyright infringement unless it was nearly or totally
ineffective. "Inhibit" must include something less than "stop", otherwise "pre-
vent" would have no meaning in the section. However, if a CPT is only aimed
at preventing something which is not a breach of copyright (such as playing
DVDs: Australian Video Retailers v Warner) then it will not constitute a "tech-
nological protection measure".60 So the scope of "technological protection
measure" is very broad but with very large holes.
Similarly, it does not matter that a "copy control mechanism" also stops
the copying of content that is not protected by copyright (eg public domain
material, or individual items in a database) or stops copying in circumstances
which would not be a breach of copyright because defences apply.
The use of"designed" in that definition implies that a device must be
intended by its designer to protect copyright, and not merely inadvertently
do so (as any computer security device might do). It must have some
effectiveness.61
Second, knowledge or belief that infringement of copyright will take place
is not required by section 116A, only knowledge or belief that a technologi-
cal protection measure will be circumvented. If it were believed that the
circumvention device was only going to be used in relation to public domain
works, or data items in a database, this would not be an excuse.
Third, although only a copyright owner or exclusive licensee can take
action (section 116A(5)), it is sufficient if they have one copyright work
protected by the relevant device being circumvented, even if no one intends
59 Koelman (n 49 above). "Preparatory activities" means the making of and dealing with circumven-
tion devices, the "upstream" activities.
60 1 am indebted to John McPhail on this point: personal communication on file with author.
61 If a device is intended to protect copyright works, but is in fact quite ineffective to do so, is it still a
"technological protection measure"? This does not matter because, following the WTO Treaty,
there is only a "circumvention device if it has the purpose of circumventing an effective technologi-
cal protection measure" (s 10 definition of "circumvention device").
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to use the device to circumvent protection in that work. Copyright owners
can, therefore, commence actions which are really intended to protect tech-
nologically protected content which does not have copyright protection.
In Hong Kong, the defendant is only liable if he or she deals with or pos-
sesses the circumvention device "knowing or having reason to believe that it
will be used to make infringing copies or infringing fixations". If a particular
defendant (for example a library) possesses a device only for the purpose of
allowing "fair dealings" of works (sections 38 and 39), then this is not a breach.
If a defendant has a reasonable belief that a device in which he or she is
dealing (or possesses) will only be used for circumventions in relation to works
in the public domain (including those in which copyright has expired), or
database items in which there is no copyright, or any content in relation to
which a defence applies, then there will be no breach in the making or dealing.
In addition, uses of circumvention devices which do not involve any copies
being made, but (for example), merely prevent the collection of personal
information for privacy-protection purposes, will not be a breach.
The Hong Kong provisions are a more careful and cautious implementa-
tion of the WCT requirements, and are tied much more closely to the
protection of copyright-protected content and actions than are the Austra-
lian provisions.
Defences effectively removed in Australia
In Australia, as explained above, it is not a defence to an act of circumven-
tion that involves an incidental infringement of copyright, nor to the supply
of a circumvention device, that the user's purpose would otherwise give a
defence to an infringement action (such as the "fair dealing" defences in sec-
tions 40-43). Circumvention, not infringement, are what is important.
There are various provisions allowing supply of circumvention devices for
some purposes to libraries, archives, educational institutions, the Crown, law
enforcement agencies, etc.62 These exemptions involve the approved type of
institution making a declaration to the provider of the circumvention device
identifying the category of exemption and stating that "a work ... to which
the person proposes to use the device ... is not readily available to the person
in a form that is not protected by a technological protection measure".
However, these exemptions do not include the "fair dealing" defences
(sections 40-43), of use for research or study, criticism and review, reporting
news, or providing professional advice. Fair uses, and the privacy of fair use, are
not recognised by this legislation." In order to preserve the effective exercise of
"fair dealing" rights, the "right to circumvent" suggested above is needed.
62 Sees 116A(3)-(4A) and (7)-(9). There is a separate national security exemption ins 116A(2).
63 Compare Cohen (n 38 above), Part V "The First Amendment Case Against the Proposed Anti-
Tampering Law".
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As discussed above, in Hong Kong, dealing in a circumvention device
without reason to believe it would be used for infringing uses would not be a
breach, and nor would possessing it in the course of a business. Use of a de-
vice for a non-infringing purpose is not a breach, because use does not cause
liability. The Hong Kong legislation is, therefore, better than the Australian
legislation on this point. However, in practice, the lack of availability of cir-
cumvention devices may mean that most users of digital works who would be
theoretically entitled to take advantage of fair use exemptions will be unable
to do so.64
Liability for publishing information about circumvention
Hong Kong imposes liability if a person "publishes information intended to
enable or assist persons to circumvent that form of copy-protection" (section
273(2)(b)). The use of "intended" will raise difficult questions concerning
some publications (eg academic papers and technical reports) which could
have such an effect.
Another problem would be a website which provides links to overseas
websites where circumvention devices may be downloaded. In the United
States, eight motion picture companies have brought a case against 2600
Magazine to enjoin it from publishing or linking to DeCSS, a computer pro-
gram used to circumvent the encryption used in DVDs, and other similar
cases have been commenced, but none concluded.6' The case is being de-
fended on the grounds that the anti-trafficking provisions of the DMCA are
unconstitutional because they infringe First Amendment freedom of speech
rights. Like the United States, consideration needs to be given to whether
section 273(2)(b) is inconsistent with the protection of freedom of expres-
sion in the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance (Cap 383), on the basis that
it goes beyond what is "necessary" to protect the rights of others. 66 It would
also be necessary to take into account Article 34 of the Basic Law providing
that "Hong Kong residents shall have freedom to engage in academic research,
literary and artistic creation, and other cultural activities". At the least, these
provisions should lead to a narrow reading of section 273(2)(b).
In Australia, there are prohibitions on anyone who "by way of trade ...
otherwise promotes, advertises or markets, such a circumvention device"
(section 1 16A(1)(ii)) or "makes such a circumvention device available online
to an extent that will affect prejudicially the owner of the copyright" (section
116A(1)(vi)), or provides or promotes a circumvention service, if "the per-
64 Compare Koelman (n 49 above), "Preparatory activities".
65 For a review and current status of all of the "DeCSS cases", see the "OpenLaw: Open DVD" forum
at http://eon.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/DVD/ (Berkman Centre, Harvard Law School).
66 Artl6(3), s 8 Hong Kong Bill of Rights, Bill of Rights Ordinance (Cap 383).
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son knew, or ought reasonably to have known, that the device or service
would be used" for circumvention. A person who merely provides informa-
tion about circumvention devices on a non-commercial basis (eg an academic
or technical paper) is unlikely to fall within these provisions. Whether a
hypertext link to a circumvention device "makes [it] ... available online" un-
der section 116A(1)(vi) is similar to the more general question of whether
providing hypertext links to any work constitutes an infringement of the new
right of "making available to the public" under both the Australian and Hong
Kong legislation. This is a broader question than can be pursued here, but
there is some opinion that links may constitute "making available".67 Unlike
the United States or Hong Kong, there are in Australia no entrenched rights
of freedom of speech (outside political matters) which could be used to attack
these provisions.
Broad and ill-defined scope of devices covered
In Australia, the definition of "technological protection measure" has been
broadened from that in the Bill, so that it now includes "a copy control mecha-
nism" as well as forms of "access control". The access control protection will
protect the use of CPT aimed at access limitation such as "crypto-bottling" of
works (where access depends on use of a particular decryption key) or the
simple device of providing on-line (or CD-ROM) access only by password.
Technologies to make digital artefacts expire after use or after a period could
also be protected here.
"Copy control mechanism" is undefined, and its possible meaning is most
uncertain. It would, for example, include any technology which limits print-
ing from webpages or databases in any way. However, would it include ex post
facto technological means of detecting copyright infringements, such as the
use of web spiders to search for unauthorised copies of digital works? These
are not access controls, but could well be considered "a copy control
mechanism". The inclusion of surveillance devices as protected technology
could have significant privacy implications. Similarly, a digital watermark or
similar device of steganography, does not prevent access, but it may well be
regarded as "a copy control mechanism" in that it both inhibits copying and
allows its detection. Such devices would include a code that a word processor
or a hypertext markup language (HTML) editor could put into documents to
identify if it was created by a licensed copy of software. The question courts
67 Ross McLean and Anne Flahvin, "The Digital Agenda Act: how the new copyright law (and contract)
is redefining the relationship between users and owners of copyright" (2001) CyberLRes 211,
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/CyberLRes/2001/21/. See also Ross McLean and Anne Flahvin,
"Aspects of the New Right to Communicate", UNSW Continuing Legal Education Conference,
Nov 2000.
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will have to resolve is whether "copy control" includes deterrence or detection.
The reference to "inhibit" in the Australian definition supports such an
interpretation.
If web spiders are copy control mechanisms, it then becomes a question of
whether a website operator can circumvent them without "making" a cir-
cumvention device, or obtaining one from someone else who will then be
dealing in a circumvention device. At what point will writing a few lines of
software to configure a web server differently become "making" a circumven-
tion device?
In Hong Kong, works are protected if they are made available "in any form
which is copy-protected" (section 273(1)(b)). Copy-protection "include(s)
any device or means specifically intended to prevent or restrict copying of a
work or fixation of a performance or to impair the quality of copies or fixa-
tions made" (section 273(4)). This will not cover access control mechanisms,
except where circumvention of access control does involve the making of
copies of a work. The Hong Kong definition only refers to "prevent or restrict",
and it is possible that "restrict" might be interpreted as broadly as "inhibit".
Alternatively, "prevent" could be interpreted as only meaning "stop copying
occurring under some circumstances" in which case it is narrower than
"inhibit". If so it seems unlikely that this would include web spiders or
steganography, which merely deter copying by increasing the likelihood of
detection.
As an example of a possible copy control mechanism, works may be issued
on DVDs including a region control coding, and selling DVD players allow-
ing the playing of DVDs from all regions circumvents that control. In situations
like this, where works are merely viewed, the question arises as to whether
the viewing involves the generation of something sufficiently permanent to
constitute a "copy" (for example, the caching68 of a webpage). Although sec-
tion 23(6) says that "copying" includes making copies which are transient
or incidental to other uses of the work, section 65 provides that
"[n]otwithstanding s23, copyright in a work is not infringed by the making of
a transient or incidental copy which is technically required for the viewing or
listening of the work by a member of the public to whom a copy of the work
is made available".
68 "The files you automatically request by looking at a Web page are stored on your hard disk in a
cache subdirectory under the directory for your browser (for example, Internet Explorer). When
you return to a page you've recently looked at, the browser can get it from the cache rather than the
original server, saving you time and the network the burden of some additional traffic." (from Whatis?
com definition of "cache"), see http://searchWebManagement.techtarget.com/sDefinition/O,,
sid27_gci2l1728,00.html.
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Unclear exemption for other commercial purposes
In Australia, circumvention devices and services are restricted to those that
have "only a limited commercially significant purpose or use ... other than
the circumvention". The section would be clearer if it said "no commercially
significant purpose or use". If, for example, a new version of a web browser
included useful printing features which incidentally made some forms of in-
hibiting printing of webpages ineffective, this would seem unlikely to be a
circumvention device because the printing feature is otherwise commercially
significant. Similarly, if an Internet service provider (ISP) excluded all web
robots from its site69 (which may host many other content sites), and thereby
excluded some which were searching for copyright-infringing content, then
this would not be a breach (even if - as discussed above - such a robot were a
"technological protection measure") because such a service or exclusion has
many other commercially significant purposes and uses, such as reducing sys-
tem load. However, if an ISP "made" and used software which excluded only
those robots which searched for IP infringements, it might be a different matter.
The Hong Kong prohibition on dealing with devices is limited to "any
device or means specifically designed or adapted to circumvent the form of
copy-protection employed" (s273(2)(a)). This limitation to devices "specifi-
cally designed" to circumvent will serve to exempt devices which have more
general purposes but incidentally defeat a form of copy protection.
Surveillance of users' computers may be authorised
A digital artefact resident on a user's PC can be designed so that it cannot be
accessed or copied unless there is first an online check back to the copyright
owner's database to confirm that the licence allows this and is still valid (The
author calls this "IP, phone home"). This could be regarded in Australia as
either an "access ... process" or "a copy control mechanism" protected by
section 116A. Making or providing devices or services to prevent this sur-
veillance will be illegal even if the personal information which is collected by
the technological device is used primarily for secondary purposes (eg
marketing) which have nothing to do with copyright protection. This will be
so even if the main reason the information is collected is for marketing
purposes, because the surveillance will still have some effect in "inhibiting"
copyright infringements. Furthermore, the circumvention will be illegal
whether or not normal privacy protections in the collection of personal in-
formation have been observed.
69 The Robot Exclusion Protocol is observed voluntarily by most commercial web spiders, see A Stan-
dard for Robot Exclusion, http://www.robotstxt.org/wc/norobots.html, and "A Method for Web Robots
Control" (an "Internet Draft", a working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force, 1996,
expired June 1997), http://www.robotstxt.org/wc/norobots-rfc.html. Site administrators have the
technical capacity to exclude specific robots from their site compulsorily if they do not obey the
protocol.
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One of the most far-reaching forms of surveillance by and of digital works
is, therefore, protected against circumvention - it will be illegal to assist users
to circumvent such surveillance. The EC Copyright Directive provisions on
anti-circumvention raise similar problems of interpretation.70
Such collection may be in breach of privacy laws, though this is not cer-
tain (see the next section). As a matter of policy, anti-circumvention
provisions should not provide protection for any technological measures that
do not meet privacy protection standards required by legislation. The DMCA
provides an explicit defence against its anti-circumvention provisions where
circumvention is only for the purpose of protection of personally identifying
information, but the protection can be defeated by "conspicuous notice".7
Other variants of online surveillance of users might be less clearly within
the definition of "technological protection measures". For example, a digital
artefact that recorded its own usage even when offline, and then (once it
went online) sent this information "home" so that users could be charged for
usage, or for detection of breaches of licence conditions (such as copying or
printing), probably would not be regarded as an access control mechanism,
but could still be argued to be a copy control mechanism, if "control" is inter-
preted to include deterrence or detection.
Under the Hong Kong provisions, it is less clear whether digital artefacts
on a user's PC that send information "home" when they are online are pro-
tected against circumvention. As discussed above, it seems that many devices
attempting to prevent unauthorised access to any online or CD-ROM access
to works will be covered, because of the wide definition of "copy-protection".
However, as with Australia, protection of the recording of usage details and
ex post facto reporting of them when the artefact goes online will depend on
whether "copy-protection" is interpreted to include deterrence and detection,
but this is less likely in Hong Kong. Also, in Hong Kong, a circumvention
device must be used to make infringing copies, and devices that block surveil-
lance are unlikely to do this.
If (despite the above argument) online surveillance of usage is regarded as
a copy protection device in Hong Kong, any protection for users against sec-
ondary usage of the information (such as marketing uses) will depend on Hong
70 Bygrave (n 12 above) says the Directive "provides no obvious answer".
71 See US Code Title 17Sec 1201 (i) Protection of Personally Identifying Information, providing that it is
not a breach to circumvent "the capability of collecting or disseminating personally identifying
information reflecting the online activities of a natural person" if the following conditions are satisfied:
"(a) the access controls collect or disseminate information about the online activities of a person;
(b) conspicuous notice about this information processing is not given;
(c) the data subject is not provided the ability to prevent the information being gathered and
disseminated; and
(d) the disabling of the controls has the sole effect, and is solely for the purpose, of preventing the
collection and dissemination."
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Kong's privacy laws, as the Copyright Ordinance does not itself impose any
limits on use of the information collected.
Conclusions
In summary, in most respects the Hong Kong anti-circumvention provisions
are narrower than the Australian provisions, as they tie the protection of
technology more closely to breaches of copyright. This approach is preferable
to the Australian provisions which can far more easily result in the anti-
circumvention provisions being breached in circumstances having little to
do with breaches of copyright.
Protection of Rights Management Information (RMI) - Australia and Hong Kong
Australia
In relation to RMI, section 116B of the Copyright Act 1968 provides a right
of action to the copyright owner or exclusive licensee where "a person re-
moves or alters any electronic rights management information attached to a
copy" of copyright subject matter without permission and where "the person
knew, or ought reasonably to have known, that the removal or alteration
would induce, enable, facilitate or conceal an infringement of the copyright
in the work or other subject-matter" (which knowledge is presumed by sec-
tion 116B(3)).
Additional actions in relation to commercial dealings with copyright sub-
ject matter from which RMI has been removed are provided in section 116C,
where the relevant knowledge is that the person knew, or ought reasonably
to have known, that the removal of the RMI "would induce, enable, facilitate
or conceal an infringement of the copyright in the work or other subject-
matter" (which knowledge is presumed by section 116C(3)).
Criminal offences equivalent to the actions in section 116B and section
116C are provided in section 132(5D) which makes it a criminal offence to
"remove or alter any electronic rights management information attached to a
copy of a work", provided there is the required intent,7 2 and in section 132
(5D) which provides related offences concerning distributing, importing and
communicating artefacts where such information has been removed or altered.
72 Section 132(5D) provides:
"(5C) A person must not remove or alter any electronic rights management information at-
tached to a copy of a work or other subject-matter in which copyright subsists, except with the
permission of the owner or exclusive licensee of the copyright, if the person knows, or is reck-
less as to whether, the removal or alteration will induce, enable, facilitate or conceal an
infringement of the copyright in the work or other subject-matter."
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"Electronic rights management information" is defined in section 10 in
terms very similar" to those in Article 12(2) of the WCT and Article 19 of
the WPPT:7
Electronic rights management information means:
(a) information attached to a copy of a work or other subject-matter that:
(i) identifies the work or subject-matter, and its author or copyright
owner; and
(ii) identifies or indicates some or all of the terms and conditions on
which the work or subject-matter may be used, or indicates that
the use of the work or subject-matter is subject to terms or
conditions; and
(b) any numbers or codes that represent such information in electronic
form.
Hong Kong
The Hong Kong Copyright Ordinance, section 274, includes a definition of
RMI which is essentially the same as the WCT and Australian definitions
in its effect, though different in its wording. "A person who provides rights
management information" has the same rights and remedies as a copyright
owner has in respect of an infringement of copyright against a person who
"removes or alters any electronic rights management information provided
by him without his authority". The definition of RMI is in effect the same
as in Australia.71
RMI: Analysis
The Hong Kong and Australian provisions are similar in relation to their
effect on user privacy in most respects.
Identifying information can be RMI
The Australian section 10 definition of RMI does not explicitly refer to infor-
mation identifying the user (the owner of the copy of the work in most cases).
7 Though the Australian provision conjoins (a)(i) and (a)(ii) with "and", not "or".
7 WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty.
75 Section 274(3). References in this section to RMI mean:
"(a) information which identifies the work, the author of the work, the owner of any right in
the work, the performer, or the performance of the performer;
(b) information about the terms and conditions of use of the work, the person having fixation
rights in relation to the performance, or the performance; or
(c) any numbers or codes that represent such information, when any of these items of infor-
mation is attached to a copy of a work or a fixed performance or appears in connection
with the making available of a work or a fixed performance to the public."
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Bygrave and Koelman question whether the WTC definition includes infor-
mation identifying users such as the Purchaser ID (in the Imprimatur model).76
The WCT, Australian and Hong Kong definitions of RMI all include "condi-
tions" on which a work may be used. If a work has been licensed on the basis of
a "single user" licence to a specified individual, it is hard to see why the identity
of that individual is not part of the conditions of use. If this is correct, then any
information about users that is a necessary part of a condition of use is RMI and
cannot be removed (provided it is "attached") without breach of the RMI
provisions.77 However, any information about users that is not a necessary part
of a condition of use is not RMI and can be removed. In comparison, the DMCA
provisions defining "copyright management information" imply that any infor-
mation concerning users is not included.
Information transmitted is not RMI
The definition of RMI in both Australia and Hong Kong only includes infor-
mation which is "attached" to the work. The protection of RMI would,
therefore, not extend to the prevention of blocking the online transmission
of RMI back to some central collection point ("IP , phone home") each time
the work is used. This interpretation is also supported by the use of "remove".
The RMI provisions, therefore, protect the passive storage of RMI, but not its
active dissemination. The WTC, Article 12, requires protection of informa-
tion which "appears in connection with the communication of a work to the
public" as well as to "attached information", but this does not seem to require
protection of information sent back to a central collection point.
RMI does not include information about actual usage
The definition of RMI in both the WTC, Article 12, and section 10 (Australia)
does not refer to information about actual usage of a work, but only to its
"conditions" of use. Ongoing collection of actual usage information by a digi-
tal work is, therefore, not RMI and can be removed. The two references in
the Hong Kong provisions to the RMI being "provided" by the copyright
owner make it even more clear that RMI protection does not extend to any
data about the actual usage of works (as distinct from usage conditions), be-
cause such data would be "provided by" the user (even if unknowingly), not
by the copyright owner.
76 See Bygrave and Koelman (n 10 above), p 53.
77 Compare Bygrave and Koelman (n 10 above), p 53.
78 See US Code Sec 1202 Integrity of copyright management information, providing that "copyright man-
agement information" includes "terms and conditions for use of the work" and "such other information
as the Registrar of Copyrights may prescribe by regulation, except that the Registrar of Copyrights
may not require the provision of any information concerning the user of a copyright work".
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"Self-help" for privacy protection is not allowed
The Australian provision prohibits removal of RMI "except with the permis-
sion of the owner of the copyright", and Hong Kong prohibits removal without
the authority of the person who provided the RMI. Article 12 of the WCT
only requires prevention of removal "without authority", and Bygrave and
Koelman" argue that in the European Union (EU) context such authority
could come from what is permitted or required by law (such as laws imple-
menting the EU Privacy Directive).
This might not seem to matter if (as argued above) RMI does not include
personal information (except perhaps the identity of a licensee where this is
a necessary part of the conditions of use of a work), so removal of such infor-
mation is not a breach of the RMI provisions.
Nevertheless, removal of such "pseudo-RMI" might require the use of an
(unobtainable) circumvention device, or if the user attempts to modify the
work to prevent the collection of this "pseudo-RMI", this may be a breach of
copyright, so the pseudo-RMI may be protected. The user still needs some
positive right similar to that found in the United States' DCMA, at least in
Australia. In Hong Kong, devices to remove RMI are less likely to be circum-
vention devices because circumvention devices must make infringing copies
(as discussed above).
Conclusions
The Australian and Hong Kong RMI provisions seem to avoid the worst threat
to privacy in that they do not make it compulsory for users to accept active
surveillance and reporting by digital artefacts that reside on their computers,
because they exclude most such personal information from the definition of
RMI. Nevertheless, they leave users defenceless against the de facto imple-
mentation of such surveillance, giving them no positive right to remove such
pseudo-RMI if to do so involves copyright breaches, and no right to obtain
the necessary circumvention devices to do so.
Conclusions - the Cumulative Effect of Anti-circumvention and RMI on Privacy
We can summarise some of the above discussion with some tentative answers
to the questions with which we started:
1 May you delete personal information that facilitates surveillance from digital
works? In both Australia and Hong Kong, if the information is neces-
sary as part of the terms of a user licence, you probably cannot because
it is protected RMI. Other personal information is not protected as
RMI. In both jurisdictions, the removal of other personal information
7 See Bygrave and Koelman (n 10 above), p 53; see also Koelman (n 49 above).
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would not per se be actionable under the anti-circumvention provisions.
In Australia, anyone dealing in devices to assist its removal could pos-
sibly be liable for dealing in circumvention devices, but in Hong Kong
this is less likely because circumvention is more closely tied to infringe-
ment of copyright.
2 May you prevent a web robot from looking for infringing artefacts? General
methods of excluding robots are exempted from being circumvention
devices under both jurisdictions as they have other significant com-
mercial uses. If only "IP bots" are excluded, then in Australia it is
uncertain whether a code to achieve this could constitute a circum-
vention device or service to circumvent "copy control". In Hong Kong
it is unlikely.
3 May you prevent a digital work from communicating information over the
Internet? Under Australian and Hong Kong law, it is possible that some
forms of such communication will be an "access ... process" protected
against circumvention, and if not they could be "copy protection". Other
communications by digital works that merely report on usage but do not
control access may be protected against circumvention if copy protec-
tion is taken to include deterrence or detection (again, less likely in Hong
Kong). Personal information in the process of communication does not
constitute RMI because it is not "attached" to the work at that point.
These examples indicate that laws facilitating technological protections
of copyright could have a very substantial impact on privacy interests, and
that significant issues need to be resolved, particularly in Australia, but less so
in Hong Kong. There is a need for a positive right to remove "pseudo-RMI"
in both jurisdictions. Even in Australia, the implementation of the WTC
provisions does not go so far as to constitute an unrestricted "licence for sur-
veillance" of our hard disks and usage habits. But it seems that the essential
surveillance task, online checking of entitlement to use digital artefacts, is
protected against circumvention. IP can phone home to check that it should
still be at your place, and there are very considerable limits to what you or
others can do to stop it.
The Effects of Privacy Laws on Technical Protection of IP
Having considered the extent to which copyright laws are facilitating
surveillance, we now need to complete the picture by asking to what extent
do existing data protection and privacy laws impose limits on the operation
of CPT and DRMS in order to protect privacy?
Hong Kong and Australia are two of the few jurisdictions outside Europe
with data protection (or "personal information protection") laws which cover
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the private sector."o Hong Kong's Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance (Cap
486) has been in force since 1995, and Australia's Privacy Act 1988 (Cth)
has applied to significant parts of the private sector since December 2001.
Since the implementation of the EC copyright Directive in May 2001,
European countries must implement both anti-circumvention / RMI laws and
data protection laws." Bygrave and Koelman have each made a number of
studies of the interrelationship between European privacy laws and anti-cir-
cumvention / RMI laws.
The experience of the United States is of limited relevance here. The
United States is unlikely to enact comprehensive data protection laws, partly
for constitutional reasons.8 The DMCA has explicit provisions limiting the
operation of the anti-circumvention and RMI-protection provisions where
they would infringe privacy, as mentioned above. Arguments that laws pro-
hibiting copyright circumvention devices diminish "the right to read
anonymously"" and may breach the guarantees of freedom of speech and
privacy in the US Constitution are of limited relevance as legal arguments in
countries such as Australia which do not have such constitutional guarantees.
These arguments, which are still unresolved in the United States, have some
potential relevance in Hong Kong, due to the limited protection of freedom
of speech in the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance and the entrenchment
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights by the Basic
Law. Most European and some other countries are more willing than the
United States" to protect privacy by general information privacy legislation,
and do not have the same constitutional constraints in doing so.86
Is DRMS Data "Personal Information"?
Most data protection laws only protect "personal data" or "personal
information", requiring that the information be capable of being linked to an
80 New Zealand and Canada are the other significant examples.
81 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 Oct 1995 on the protec-
tion of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such
data (O.J. L 281, 23 Nov 1995, p 31 et seq.).
82 See Bygrave and Koelman (n 10 above), particularly Ch 2; Koelman (n 49 above); and Bygrave
(n 12 above).
83 Michael Froomkin, "The Death of Privacy?" (May 2000) Stan. L. Rev. 146, draft available at
http://personal.law.miami.edu/-froomkin/articles/privacy-deathof.pdf.
84 Cohen (n 38 above).
85 In many other countries, there is likely to be less reluctance to interfere in "private orderings" of
transactional relationships concerning IP by legislation, for example by compulsory licensing schemes.
Even in the United States, compulsory terms in such contractual relationships are not so unusual.
William W. Fisher stresses that compulsory terms in contracts are not at all unusual in the US, and
proposes a set of such compulsory contractual terms for contracts concerning IP rights: see William
W. III Fisher, "Property and contracts on the internet" (1998) 73 Chicago - Kent Law Review 1203,
draft at http://www.law.harvard.edu/AcademicAffairs/coursepages/tfisher/compuls99.htm.
86 Froomkin (n 83 above).
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identifiable individual. However, legislation usually allows the data in ques-
tion to be combined with other data to produce this identification, but
expresses how this combination may be achieved in different ways. For
example, in Australia's Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) "personal information"
means any information "about an individual whose identity is apparent, or
can reasonably be ascertained, from the information or opinion" in question
(section 6). Hong Kong's definition is similar.87
In many cyberspace transactions, what will constitute "personal informa-
tion" is uncertain, and this may have a severe effect on the applicability of
data protection laws to those transactions. In Australian law, whether ma-
chine addresses and e-mail addresses would constitute personal information
would usually be a question of fact in a particular case." Bygrave and Koelman
also thought this was uncertain. 9
In the DRMS context, there may be many doubtful situations. For example,
if a web spider merely collects the identification number of a licensed digital
work, but it is possible for that identification number to be subsequently cor-
related (perhaps via a number of steps) with the identity of the individual
who holds the licence, has the web spider been involved in the collection of
personal information? Questions may also arise whether, if part of the infor-
mation is accessible to the public on a webpage, the combined information
can still be "personal information", but this will depend on the wording of
particular legislative provisions.90
However, these types of definitions may miss the real point of many
cyberspace interactions. If a DRMS can determine that a copy of a digital
work it has located on the net (or which has reported to it) is an infringing
copy, or is being used in breach of its licence, and it can initiate enforcement
action without knowing the identity of the person who is responsible, it has
acted against an individual and with serious consequences. For example, if a
digital work merely sends "back to base" information about the PC on which
it is located, or the Internet sub-domain on which it resides, but there is no
record in the rights-owner's database of a licence in relation to those locations,
so that the work automatically ceases to be useable, where is the collection or
use of personal information? Similarly, if information about the reading hab-
its of a pseudonymous licensee can be aggregated so that it is commercially
87 Section 2 defines "personal data":
" 'personal data' means any data-
(a) relating directly or indirectly to a living individual;
(b) from which it is practicable for the identity of the individual to be directly or indirectly
ascertained; and
(c) in a form in which access to or processing of the data is practicable".
88 Graham Greenleaf, "Privacy principles - irrelevant to cyberspace?" (1996) 3 PLPR 114, http://
www.austlii.edu.au//au/other/plpr/vol3No6/vO3nO6d.html.
89 See Bygrave and Koelman (n 10 above), p 14.
90 See Greenleaf (n 2 above), Part F "Stopping Searching - Robot Exclusion Standards" for discussion.
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valuable to market other digital works to that individual, and there is access
to an e-mail address which makes this possible, the publisher has no need to
know the identity of the individual marketed to.
This weakness in definitions of personal information may place a signifi-
cant limit on the capacity of data protection laws to protect privacy in relation
to surveillance systems used for copyright protection.
Anonymity and Pseudonymity as Privacy Rights
It is possible for many aspects of DRMS and CPT to be designed so that pseud-
onymity (and in some cases anonymity) of licensees can be preserved, while
still protecting the core economic interests of rights-holders. However, the sec-
ondary economic interests of rights-holders (or intermediaries) in being able to
exploit the personal information that they obtain from DRMS are in direct
conflict with rights of anonymity and pseudonymity. Issues of purpose specifi-
cation will be crucial. DRMS intermediaries can use pseudonymity in order to
maintain their ability to identify copyright infringements of digital artefacts,
while preventing secondary use of the identifiable information by rights owners.
Many authors have identified the availability of pseudonymous transactions as
a key element of the design of DRMS that protect privacy.91
In Australia's privacy law, National Privacy Principle (NPP) 8 "Anonym-
ity" requires that "[w]herever it is lawful and practicable, individuals must have
the option of not identifying themselves when entering transactions with an
organisation". This "anonymity principle" is unusual in data protection laws,"
but does have a precedent in Germany.93 It is not explicitly required by the EC
data protection Directive. Although the title of NPP 8 only refers to ano-
nymity and not pseudonymity, the words "not identifying themselves" are broad
enough to encompass systems which allow pseudonymity, with actual identifi-
cation only being permitted under certain conditions.
91 See for example Graham Greenleaf, "'IP, phone home' ECMS, (c)-tech, and protecting privacy
against surveillance by digital works" Proceedings of the 2 1st International Conference on Privacy
and Personal Data Protection, Hong Kong, 1999, Proceedings text available online at http://www.
pco.org.hk/english/infocentre/files/greenleaf-paper.doc, HTML version available at http://austlii.
edu.au/-graham/publications/ip-privacy/; Jonathan Weinberg, "Hardware-Based ID, Rights
Management, and Trusted Systems" (2000) 52 Stan. L. Rev. 125, http://www.law.wayne.edu/weinberg/
newstanford.PDF.
92 Its Australian origins lie in Principle 10 of the Australian Privacy Charter (1994): "People should
have the option of not identifying themselves when entering transactions" (see Australian Privacy
Charter Council (1994) Australian Privacy Charter, http://www.anu.edu.au/people/Roger.Clarke/
DV/PrivacyCharter.html). In 1998, the Australian Privacy Commissioner's National Principles for
the Fair Handling of Personal Information included Principle 8 as now appears in the Act (with "should"
in place of "must").
93 See n 96 below and accompanying text.
94 There is debate within the EC as to whether it is implied by the Directive (personal communication
with Lee Bygrave); see Bygrave (n 12 above) for discussion.
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There is no explicit equivalent in the Hong Kong Privacy Ordinance. It
would be difficult to read a requirement of pseudonymity or anonymity into
the scattered words of Data Protection Principle (DPP) 1,1 requiring that
data collected is "necessary for", "directly related to" or "adequate but not
excessive in relation to" the purpose of collection. Similarly, it is unlikely
that the words "unless the information is necessary for one or more of its
functions or activities" in Australia's NPP 1 would be interpreted to require
pseudonymity or anonymity.
One of the few other examples is Germany's Teleservices Data Protection
Act (Article 2 of the Information and Communications Services Act of 1997),
which requires the objective of minimising or eliminating the collection and
use of personal information to be built into the "design and selection of tech-
nical devices" (hardware and software):
"s3(4) The design and selection of technical devices to be used for
teleservices shall be oriented to the goal of collecting, processing and us-
ing either no personal data at all or as few data as possible."
This design requirement makes meaningful the specific requirement on
service providers to provide anonymous and pseudonymous uses of teleservices
"to the extent technically feasible and reasonable", 96 because it removes the
excuse that systems have not been designed to allow for anonymous or pseud-
onymous transactions. Here, the control of architecture by law is both a serious,
though general, limitation on the types of Internet systems that may be built,
and a necessary precondition for legal sanctions aimed directly at the behaviour
of service providers.
One of the main differences between this Australian formulation and that
in the German law is that it does not have the explicit legislative require-
ment for systems to be designed to allow anonymity and pseudonymity. The
Australian provision might, therefore, be interpreted to allow the excuse that
it is not "practicable" because the system design makes it technically impossible.
However, the strong wording of "must have the option" may be interpreted
to at least require any systems designed after the legislation commences to
provide anonymity and pseudonymity options wherever "practicable".
Data protection commissioners are increasingly aware of the importance
of this issue. The Article 29 Working Party of European Data Protection
Commissioners made recommendations in 1997 concerning anonymity on
95 Schedule 1.
96 "s4( 1 ) The provider shall offer the user anonymous use and payment of teleservices or use and
payment under a pseudonym to the extent technically feasible and reasonable. The user shall be
informed about these options."
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the Internet97 which show a clear preference for maximising anonymity in
Internet transactions, subject to balancing this with other rights. In 2000,
the International Working Group on Data Protection in Telecommunications,
drawn from data protection agencies worldwide, specifically recommended
the development of DRMS "which allow for anonymous or pseudonymous
transactions".9
Limits on Collection
The aspect of Australia's NPPs and Hong Kong's DPPs which will have the
most direct impact on the operation of copy-protection technologies are the
principles governing collection of personal information, NPP 1 (Australia)
and DPP 1 (Hong Kong). Various aspects of the collection principles could
be relevant.
Collection must be by "fair means and not in an unreasonably intrusive
way" (NPP 1.2) or "fair in the circumstances of the case" (DPP 1(2)(b)).
Surreptitious use of cookies, web bugs or web spiders could potentially in-
fringe these provisions. Personal data can only be collected if it is "necessary
for one or more of [the collector's] functions or activities" (NPP 1) or "neces-
sary for", "directly related to" or "adequate but not excessive in relation to"
the purpose of collection (DPP 1).
9 Art 29 Committee 1997, The Working Party On The Protection Of Individuals With Regard To
The Processing Of Personal Data, Recommendation 3/97 Anonymity on the Internet (3 Dec 1997),
http://europa.eu.int/comm/intemal-market/en/dataprot/wpdocs/wp6en.htm.
They recommerit that, where appropriate, the "minimum necessary collection" principle "should
specify that individual users be given the right of anonymity". A surprising limitation of the work-
ing party's approach is that it does not adequately distinguish anonymity and pseudonymity, nor
pursue the extent to which pseudonymity should be offered where anonymity is not practicable.
The following main conclusions are relevant here:
* The ability to choose to remain anonymous is essential if individuals are to preserve the same
protection for their privacy on-line as they currently enjoy off-line.
* Anonymity is not appropriate in all circumstances. Determining the circumstances in which
the "anonymity option" is appropriate and those in which it is not requires the careful balanc-
ing of fundamental rights, not only to privacy but also to freedom of expression, with other
important public policy objectives such as the prevention of crime.
* Wherever possible the balance that has been struck in relation to earlier technologies should
be preserved with regard to services provided over the Internet.
* The ... purchase of most goods and services over the Internet should all be possible anonymously.
* Anonymous means to access the Internet (eg public Internet kiosks, pre-paid access cards) and
anonymous means of payment are two essential elements for true on-line anonymity.
98 International Working Group on Data Protection in Telecommunications 2000, Common Position
on Privacy and Copyright Management adopted at the 27th Meeting of the Working Group on
4-5 May 2000 in Rethymnon / Crete, http://www.datenschutz-berlin.de/doc/int/iwgdpt/co-en.htm.
For the importance of the distinction between anonymity and pseudonymity, see Roger Clarke,
"Identified, Anonymous and Pseudonymous Transactions: The Spectrum of Choice", IFIP User
Identification & Privacy Protection Conference, Stockholm June 1999, http://www.anu.edu.au/people/
Roger.Clarke/DV/UIPP99.html and Anita Smith and Roger Clarke, "Identification, Authentica-
tion and Anonymity in a Legal Context", IFIP User Identification & Privacy Protection Conference,
Stockholm, June 1999, http://www.anu.edu.au/people/Roger.Clarke/DV/AnonLegal.html.
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An important protection of privacy in DRMS systems will be if individu-
als must be given notice when information is collected about them. In
Australia, notice of collection, use and disclosure practices must be given to
the individual "at or before the time (or, if that is not practicable, as soon as
practicable after) an organisation collects personal information about an in-
dividual from the individual" (NPP 1.3), and "reasonable steps" must be taken
to give such notice to the individual even where the information is collected
from third parties ("from someone else": NPP 1.5). Hong Kong's DPP 1 has
similar provisions, but notice is only required in relation to collection di-
rectly from the data subject. In both Australia and Hong Kong, it is
questionable whether, when information is collected about a person from a
website, or even from the individual's computer, it is collected from "the in-
dividual" (Australia) or from "the data subject" (Hong Kong). If it is not so
collected, but instead classified as collected from observation / surveillance,
no notice is required. The correct interpretation is unresolved, but the better
view is that observation of a person, or extraction of information from that
person's private computer files (as distinct from pages on a publicly accessible
website) should be regarded as collection from the person."
Many aspects of data collection by DRMS will be with the consent of the
data subject, or pursuant to a contract with the data subject. They will,
therefore, have to comply with the normal requirements of disclosure of
purpose, and limitations on excessive collection (as discussed above)."
More contentious forms of collection of personal information are likely to
arise because of the surveillance aspects of DRMS. If an MSP uses a web
spider solely for the purpose of collecting RMI, or if the digital work sends
reports back to the MSP, it may be collecting "personal information" (see
discussion above). The MSP may be in a contractual relationship with the
person concerned (a licensee), but questions may arise as to whether the col-
lection is with consent, or (in EU Directive terms) the collection is necessary
for the performance of the contract or for the purpose of the legitimate inter-
ests of the MSP or its client. Disclosure of surveillance practices at the time of
contract will probably be necessary, as it may be impossible at the time of
collection (for example, collection by web spiders).
If the person whose personal information is collected has no relevant con-
tractual relationships (for example, a person whose machine address is disclosed
as the location of a digital work), then there will be no consent to collection
and no contract, so justification for collection may be more difficult to provide.
99 See Graham Greenleaf, "Key concepts undermining the NPPs - A second opinion" (2001) 8 Privacy
Law & Policy Reporter 1 for related discussion.
100 For discussion, see Bygrave and Koelman (n 10 above), p 16, also p 27.
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Recommendations of the European data protection commissioners
The Working Party on The Protection of Individuals With Regard to the
Processing of Personal Data set up under the EU privacy Directive (the Ar-
ticle 29 Committee) made recommendationso'0 concerning automated
processing which is unknown to the user.10 2 All five recommendations are
relevant to the collection of data by DRMS and CPT:
1 Processing of personal data by [digital works] which occurs without the knowl-
edge of the data subject is not legitimate processing (Recommendation 1).
Examples of where this may occur are given above.
2 Digital works should provide Internet users with information about "the data
that they intend to collect, store or transmit and the purpose for which they
are necessary" (Recommendation 2). Where cookies are used, they say,
users should be informed in generally understandable language when-
ever a cookie is to be received, stored or sent. Germany's Teleservices
Data Protection Act already provides such a requirement of notifica-
tion before processing commences (section 3(5)).
3 Default configurations should not "allow for collecting, storing or sending of
client persistent information". This means that, in default, browsers should
only send the minimum information needed for communication, and
should in default refuse to receive cookies (Recommendation 3). Who
controls the default settings of cyberspace architecture is one of the
key regulatory issues in cyberspace.13
4 Users should be able to "freely decide" about the processing of their personal
data, and modify what items are processed (Recommendation 4).
5 Users should be able "to remove client persistent information in a simple
way" (Recommendation 5). One problem with applying this to digital
works is that it could result in a breach of copyright laws protecting
RMI (see discussion above).
Recommendations 3-5 seem inconsistent with many possible implemen-
tations of technological protection of digital works, where it is an essential
part of the protection of the work that the user does not have a choice but to
submit to surveillance as a condition of licensing the work.
101 Feb 1999. They have not yet been implemented. The recommendations are expressed as applying
to "internet hardware and software products". It would be better if they also applied expressly to
digital works, as the issues are the same, but it is straining language to call a digital artwork "software".
"Digital works" have been substituted for "software" in this discussion.
102 Art 29 Committee 1999, The Working Party On The Protection Of Individuals With Regard To
The Processing Of Personal Data, Recommendation 1/99 on Invisible and Automatic Processing of Per-
sonal Data on the Internet Performed by Software and Hardware (23 Feb 1999), http://europa.eu.int/
comm/intemal-market/en/dataprot/wpdocs/wp 1 7en.htm/.
103 See Greenleaf (n 2 above).
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Limits on Use and Disclosure
The finality principle could have significant implications for the operation of
DRMS. NPP 2 in the Australian Act prevents personal information collected
by CPT from being used or disclosed for any secondary purpose unless the
secondary use is a directly related use which would be reasonably expected, is
one given consent, or is one for marketing purposes, and the individual is
given the opportunity to "opt-out" from further marketing communications
from that organisation. Hong Kong's DPP 2 and section 34 (direct marketing)
have a similar effect.
Secondary uses, particularly marketing uses, are analysed by Bygrave and
Koelman, 04 who note a number of European provisions which could have a
significant effect on DRMS operations.
In relation to automated processing, Article 15(1) of the EU privacy Di-
rective gives persons the right not to be subject to decisions based on automated
processing which evaluates information about the personality of the data sub-
ject for the purpose of decisions which may have a significant effect on the
person. 0 ' If a CPT terminated the useability of a digital work because of
automated processing of information about breaches or expiry of a licence, it
could be caught if the information processed included personal information.
The processing would have to be shown to be done pursuant to a contract,
and even then would have to be within the data subject's reasonable
expectations. There is no equivalent protection against automated process-
ing in the Australian or Hong Kong legislation.
Germany's Teleservices Data Protection Act prevents the aggregation in
an identifiable form of personal information relating to the use of several
teleservices by one user (section 4). Such a restriction would significantly
limit the secondary uses of DRMS information. There is no direct equivalent
in the Australian or Hong Kong legislation, but it could be questioned whether
such aggregation is in itself a legitimate purpose of collection.
Data Export Prohibitions, Extra-Territorial Operation, and Conflicts
DRMS and CPT are likely to involve large-scale flows of personal informa-
tion between jurisdictions, as many will operate on an international scale
with data being collected from users in one jurisdiction by copyright-protec-
tion organisations located in another country.
Issues arising from this include the effect of data export prohibition
requirements, the possible extra-territorial operation of data protection laws,
and questions of conflict of laws. Only the first is discussed here.
104 Bygrave and Koelman (n 10 above), p 23.
105 See Lee Bygrave, "Minding the machine: art 15 of the EC Data Protection Directive and automated
profiling" (2000) 7 Privacy Law and Policy Reporter 67.
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Data export prohibitions
Where the end-users are located in jurisdictions the laws of which include
prohibitions on the export of personal data to countries without adequate
privacy laws ("data export prohibitions"), it will be necessary to determine
whether any organisation transfers the data to a prohibited jurisdiction, and
whether any exemption allowing this applies. Depending on the type of CPT
used, there may be information about a particular use of a digital work, or the
identity of the user, transmitted via Internet to a collector in another
jurisdiction.
As is well known, the EU Data Protection Directivel06 requires European
privacy laws to include data export prohibitions. In many instances, the ex-
ceptions in Article 26 of the EU Privacy Directive will apply,"0 ' but there are
likely exceptions such as collection by web spiders and other situations where
CPT may operate outside contractual relationships.
NPP 9 in the Australian Act prohibits personal data exports to recipients
in foreign countries unless one or more exceptions apply. Exceptions are made
where the transferor "reasonably believes" the recipient is "subject to a law,
binding scheme or contract" which effectively upholds principles substan-
tially similar to the NPPs, where "the individual consents to the transfer",
where the transfer is pursuant to certain contract or pre-contractual
negotiation, where the transfer is for the individual's presumed benefit (and
it is impractical to obtain consent), and where the exporter has taken "rea-
sonable steps" to ensure that the information will not be "held, used or
disclosed" contrary to the NPPs.
The data export prohibition in the Hong Kong Ordinance (section 33) is
the only section not yet in operation. 10 Its provisions are similar to the Aus-
tralian NPP 9, but stricter in many respects. The Hong Kong provision only
recognises foreign laws, not schemes or contracts. This is particularly impor-
tant given that the United States (the likely home of many DRMS) does not
have privacy legislation but relies upon a voluntary "Safe Harbor" scheme. 109
It only exempts consent "in writing", therefore excluding arguments that con-
sent might be implied by conduct. It does not exempt various types of contracts
and negotiations (except insofar as they involve written consent). It requires
the exporter to take not only "reasonable precautions", but also to exercise
due diligence to ensure that the data will not be "collected, held, processed or
106 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 Oct 1995 on the protec-
tion of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such
data (O.J. L 281, 23 Nov 1995, p 31 et seq.).
107 See Bygrave and Koelman (n 10 above), pp 29-31 for detailed analysis.
108 Hong Kong appears to be waiting until it is clearer how the EU and its member States will interpret
and enforce the data export provisions in the Directive.
109 US Department of Commerce, "Welcome to the Safe Harbor" website http://www.export.gov/
safeharbor/.
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used" (not only "held, used or disclosed" as in Australia) in ways that would
be contrary to the Ordinance. The Australian provision is a "watered down"
version of the Hong Kong provision, but it is in force.
In those situations where personal information is transferred to another
jurisdiction via the Internet as part of a DRMS, data export provisions could
be breached (only in Australia as yet). However, as discussed above (under
"Is DRMS data 'personal information'?"), there may be situations where the
transfer of DRMS data does not constitute "personal information" or "per-
sonal data" and, therefore, falls outside the scope of data protection laws,
even though the transfer effectively facilitates the DRMS to react to the situ-
ation on an individual basis.
Restoring the Balance - Do We Need Protection from Copyright?
What Privacy Protections Are Needed?
Large-scale implementations of full DRMS are still at an early stage, though
many specific CPT are in use. Technologies and business models are yet to
mature. It is also too early to be certain how serious the potential risks will
turn out to be, as Bygrave warns: o
"Several factors could serve to hinder the large-scale implementation of
privacy-invasive DRMS. Such systems might be marginalised by market
mechanisms - for example, strong consumer preferences for privacy, com-
bined with competition between copyright-holders to satisfy these
preferences. The take-up of privacy-invasive DRMS might also be hin-
dered by difficulties in achieving standardisation and compatibility of
technological measures."
It is, therefore, difficult to determine what privacy protections are needed.
At the same time, legislation is now giving pro-active protection to CPT and
DRMS, through anti-circumvention and RMI laws, so it is too late to do
nothing. We need to make the best effort we can to ensure that a balance is
maintained (or more likely, restored) between the protection of property and
the protection of privacy.
To restore this balance, some of the changes that need to be considered in
Australia and (to a lesser extent) in Hong Kong are as follows:
1 Anti-circumvention protections should be tied as closely as possible to
the scope of the exclusive rights of a copyright owner, and should not
protect subject matter which is in the public domain, is subject to fair
110 Bygrave (n 12 above).
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dealing defences, or merely constitutes access without breach of an
exclusive right. Hong Kong's legislation goes close to achieving this.
Australia's does not, and should be amended.
2 It should be a defence available to anyone making or dealing in anti-
circumvention devices that they have taken reasonable steps to ensure
that such devices are used only to circumvent CPT in ways which do
not breach an exclusive right of a copyright owner, or do so where a
defence against infringement is available.
3 Definitions of "personal information" and "personal data" should be
strengthened to apply to more cyberspace transactions affecting
individuals, possibly including any transactions allowing interaction
with an individual on a personalised basis.
4 Users should be given positive legal authority to remove personal in-
formation which has been collected by CPT but goes beyond the
requirements of RMI laws ("pseudo RMI"), or is in breach of privacy
laws. Blocking or removal of such information should be an exception
to copyright laws and to anti-circumvention laws.
5 Users should be given positive legal authority to circumvent wherever
they have a defence to an infringement of copyright.
6 Protections of RMI should not require individuals to consent to active
on-line surveillance and reporting by digital works on their computers,
and privacy laws should prohibit such surveillance.
7 System designers should be required by privacy laws, in the design of
DRMS, to allow anonymous transactions where commercial objectives
can be met without identification, and allow pseudonymity where it is
necessary for transactions to be identifiable in order for commercial
goals to be met.
If our laws are to explicitly protect technologies used by copyright owners,
then our laws should also give individuals positive rights to protect them-
selves against those technologies when they breach privacy laws or fail to
respect other rights such as rights of fair use.
What Can Privacy Officials Do?
Data protection and privacy commissioners also need to take steps to help
maintain or restore the balance between protections of privacy and protec-
tions of copyright:
1 They can encourage developers and vendors of CPT and DRMS in
their own jurisdiction to develop and publish privacy policies.
2 They should enforce, where appropriate, data protection laws against
the local implementations of CPT and DRMS, particularly in relation
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to the provision of anonymity / pseudonymity options and excessive
collection of information.
3 They should take an active role in local debates on legislation con-
cerning circumvention devices and RMI.
4 They should engage in dialogue and education of the local IP commu-
nity to ensure that authors, publishers and the public are sensitive to
the privacy issues involved in CPT and DRMS. Consumer organisations
should be included in any dialogues.
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